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1. Introduction 
Mobile ad hoc networks are complex wireless networks, which have little or no existing 
network infrastructure. These networks can be established in a spontaneous manner 
allowing organizations and network members to work together and communicate, without 
a fixed communication structure.  The mobility, spontaneity and ad hoc nature of these 
networks makes them optimal solutions for disaster area communication and tactical 
military networks. Due to recent wireless technology advances, mobile devices are equipped 
with sufficient resources to realize implementation of these dynamic communication 
networks.  However, for ad hoc networks to find a wide spread within both the military and 
commercial world, they must be secured against malicious attackers.  
Mobile ad hoc networks have distinct characteristics, which make them very difficult to secure.  
Such characteristics include: the lack of network infrastructure; no pre-existing relationships; 
unreliable multi-hop communication channels; resource limitation; and node mobility. Users 
cannot rely on an outside central authority, like a trusted third party (TTP) or certificate 
authority (CA), to perform security and network tasks.  The responsibility of networking and 
security is distributed among the network participants.  Users have no prior relationship with 
each other and do not share a common encryption key.  Therefore, only after the network has 
been formed, the users establish trust and networking links.  The establishment of networking 
links is identified as being vulnerable to security attacks.  Trust establishment should allow 
protection for the network layer and ensure that honest links are created.   
The sporadic connectivity of the wireless links, inherent to mobile ad hoc networks, results 
in frequent link breakages. These characteristics introduce unique challenges to trust 
establishment. Both the routing and trust establishment protocols must be designed to 
handle the unreliable wireless communication channels: the dynamic topology changes and 
the distributive nature. The security solutions used for conventional wired networks cannot 
simply be applied to mobile ad hoc networks. More complex network management must be 
implemented to achieve trust establishment in mobile ad hoc networks.  
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Ad hoc network security research initially focused on secure routing protocols. All routing 
schemes however, neglect the crucial task of secure key management and assume pre-
existence and pre-sharing of secret and/or private/public key pairs [Zhou & Haas, 1999]. 
This left key management considerations in the ad hoc network security field as an open 
research area. Security solutions which use cryptographic techniques rely on proper key 
management to establish trust.  This chapter together with the next chapter focus upon key 
management which aids these cryptographic solutions. 
Outlines of the Chapter 
This chapter and the next chapter form one unit. The two chapters focus largely upon 
establishing trust in mobile ad hoc networks, and concentrate more specifically on secure 
key management on the network layer.  Our research focuses upon providing a solution for 
the security issues found in mobile ad hoc networks.  
The current chapter is organised in the following manner: Section-2 provides a theoretical 
background to mobile ad hoc networks and the security issues that are related to such 
networks. These networks and their characteristics are defined in terms of trust 
establishment.  As the focus of this research is on the network layer, attacks specific to this 
layer are identified and explained.  
 Section-3 presents a survey of the existing key management solutions for mobile ad hoc 
networks.  Discussions are based on: functionality; availability; security services; scalability; 
efficiency; and computational cost.  A comparative summary is presented, which identifies 
the difference in the requirements and the application of each solution. 
In the next chapter , Section-2, we continue the discussions given in Section-3 of this chapter 
by offering a survey of the existing secure routing protocols for mobile ad hoc networks. The 
two sections identify the problem that the two chapters are addressing. There exists secure 
routing mechanisms to address the unique characteristics of mobile ad hoc networks, 
however, these solutions assume that key management is addressed prior to network 
establishment.  A novel, on-demand solution to the key management problem for mobile ad 
hoc networks will be introduced in next chapter. The implementation of the proposed 
model, simulation of the model, the results and there analysis are given in next chapter. 
2. Mobile ad hoc networks 
An ad hoc network is a network with no fixed infrastructure. It allows for users to enter and 
exit any time, while seamlessly maintaining communication between other nodes.  Mobile 
Ad Hoc Networks (MANETs) are advanced wireless communication networks which 
operate in an ad hoc manner.  The term ad hoc is defined as: 
“Meaning "to this" in Latin, it refers to dealing with special situations as they occur rather than 
functions that are repeated on a regular basis.” (The American Heritage Dictionary of the 
English Language, Fourth Edition. Houghton Mifflin Company, 2004) 
This definition suggests that it is a network which is formed in a spontaneous manner so as 
to solve an immediate communication need between mobile nodes.  Mobile ad hoc networks 
differ from existing wired networks because they do not rely on a fixed network 
infrastructure [Capkun et al., 2003] [Haas et al., 2002], such as base stations or mobile 
switching centres.  Instead, network functionality (e.g., routing, mobility management, etc.) 
is adopted by the nodes themselves.  When using a multi-hoping routing protocol, mobile 
nodes within each other’s radio range communicate directly via wireless links. However the 
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nodes that are far apart depend on the other nodes to relay the message in a multi-hop 
fashion. Figure 1 [Zhou & Hass, 1999] demonstrates these autonomous, multi-hop 
characteristics.  Connection between nodes is made by means of other nodes within the 
network.  In Figure 1, the circle represents wireless range of node A.  In Figure 1, when node 
D appears within the range of node A, the topology changes to maintain the connection.  
Note that all network functions are performed by the nodes and no host or outside authority 
exists. 
 
Fig. 1. Ad Hoc Network Topology 
2.1 Application 
Mobile ad hoc networks have become widely desired in military and commercial 
applications, due to the ever increasing development of mobile technology.  The network’s 
lack of infrastructure and independent nature allows for a robust network to be created 
within an unlikely networking environment. 
a.  Military Application 
The first ad hoc networks were primarily deployed in the military domain in the early 
1970’s by the US Department of Defence, under the projects of DARPA and Packet Radio 
Network (PRnet) [Haas et al., 2002].  Ad hoc networks remain an important part of current 
and future military communication. They feature prominently in the following areas of 
military application: sensor networks; tactical networks; and positional systems.   
Their application within the military field is based on the network’s high mobility, 
survivability, and self-organized nature. This allows mobile military units to communicate 
effortlessly irrespective of the distance between each detachment.  In a hostile environment, 
such as the battle field, an ad hoc network’s distributive architecture eliminates the problem 
of a vulnerable network host or the loss of the network host.  The modern battle field is 
characterized by highly mobile forces and the effect of a network which fails to maintain 
communication and high mobility is disastrous. An example of this can be seen in the 
experience of the Iraqi forces during the 1991 Gulf War.  For this reason, soldiers would 
prefer mobile ad hoc networks, as opposed to existing local networks.  Both invading and 
defending soldiers would avoid using the local operator, therefore ensuring communication 
stealth required for battle.  Another illustration of the downfall of using an existing local 
network can be seen in Chechnya, where a general was killed by a missile which tracked the 
uplink signal of his portable phone.  It is clear from these examples that mobile ad hoc 
networks provide stealth, mobility, and security in the battle field. 
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The military context is the most obvious application for mobile ad hoc networks.  More 
recently in July 2008, DARPA invested $8.5 million in the Intrinsically Assurable Mobile Ad 
Hoc Network program (IAMANET) [Jameson, 2008].  This project aims to improve the 
integrity, availability, reliability, confidentiality, safety, non-repudiation of MANET 
communication and data in the future. 
b. Commercial Application 
Early application and developments were military focused. However, non-military 
applications have grown rapidly due to the availability and advances in mobile ad hoc 
research.  The introduction of new standards such as IEEE 802.16e, IEEE 802.11g and IEEE 
802.15.4, have significantly helped the deployment of wireless ad hoc network technology in 
the commercial domain [Haas et al., 2002].  In this sector the aforementioned networks are 
desirable due to their dynamic and self organized nature, which allows rapid network 
deployment.  This is particularly useful in situations where infrastructure is damaged or 
does not exist, and where existing conventional networks are unaffordable or lack sufficient 
network coverage and need to be side-stepped.  Some examples of these applications 
include: personal area networks; sensor networks; emergency networks; and vehicular 
communication 
Personal area networks are created when a small number of nodes meet spontaneously to 
form a network for the purpose of teleconferencing, file sharing, or peer-to-peer 
communication.  An example of this can be seen when attendees in a conference room share 
data using laptops or handheld devices.   
Sensor networks are used to monitor data across an area.  An example of these networks 
includes small sensor devices which are located in animals and other strategic locations that 
collectively monitor and analyze the environmental conditions.  Sensor networks have also 
been developed, by the PermaSense Project, to monitor the permafrost found in the Swiss 
Alps [Talzi et al., 2007]. 
The application of this network to an emergency context often occurs in a hostile 
environment, similar to the military context.  Natural or man-made disasters may result in 
the existing network infrastructure being unavailable or unreliable.  Ad hoc emergency 
services could allow communication and sharing of video updates of specific locations, 
among relief workers and the command centre. An illustration can be seen in the event of 
the New York World Trade Centre disaster, on September 11, 2001.  The majority of the 
phone base stations were knocked out in less than twenty minutes, after the attack.  The 
remaining base stations were unable to operate because they could not work in ad hoc 
mode. The Wireless Emergency Rescue Team recommended afterwards that telecom 
operators provide ad hoc mode for their infrastructure in the event of emergency situations 
to enable co-operation between police, firemen and hospital networks [Karl & Rauscher, 
2001]. Mobile ad hoc networks can allow for rapid network deployment in an emergency 
situation.  Emergency networks can be set up in remote or hostile areas where there is no 
existing communication infrastructure, thereby assisting relief work and rescue missions. 
A Vehicular ad hoc network provides communication between vehicles, roadside 
equipment and vehicles travelling in close proximity.  Data is exchanged between nearby 
vehicles to provide traffic information and early warnings for accidents and road works.  
The purpose of Vehicular ad hoc networks is to provide a communication network of safety 
and information for users [Raya & Hubaux, 2005]. 
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The benefits of ad hoc networks have realized new non-military communication 
opportunities for the public. Companies are starting to recognize the potential for 
commercial ad hoc network applications, and as a result laptops and handheld devices are 
being equipped with wireless functionalities. Businesses are offering products using ad hoc 
networking technology in areas of:  law enforcement; intelligent transport systems; and 
community networking.  These dynamic networks have still not reached their full potential, 
and it is clear that ad hoc technology has an imminent role to play in the development 
commercial technology of today and the future. 
2.2 Ad hoc network challenges 
An ad hoc network is a dynamic type of network which is both similar and very different to its 
parent fixed communication network.  In the following we introduce the properties of an ad 
hoc network as a way of defining its shortcomings and to highlight its security challenges. 
a. Dynamic Network Architecture 
Ad hoc networks have no fixed or existing network infrastructure.  The network 
architecture is continuously changing as the network evolves.  There is no pre-existing or 
fixed architecture which handles all network tasks such as: routing security and network 
management. Instead, the network infrastructure is spontaneously set up in a distributive 
manner.  Each participating node shares the network’s responsibilities.  Distribution of 
network functionality avoids single point attacks and allows for the network to survive 
under harsh network circumstances. 
A fixed entity structure, such as a base station or central administration, is crucial for 
security mechanisms.  A trusted third party member [William, 1999], which is expected in 
traditional networks, is similar to a fixed entity as both define security services; manage and 
distribute secret keying information (which allows secure communication of data through 
encryption and decryption techniques).  Therefore the absence of such a control entity 
introduces new opportunities for security attacks on the network. 
b. Self Organized Nature 
Wireless ad hoc nodes cannot rely on an off-line trusted third party member.  The security 
functions of the trusted third party member are distributed among the participating nodes.  
Each node takes responsibility for establishing and maintaining its own security and is, 
therefore, the centre of its own world and authority.  A wireless ad hoc network is therefore 
referred to as a self organized network [Capkun et al, 2003]. 
c. No Prior relationships 
In ad hoc networks, nodes can have no prior relationships with other nodes within the 
network.  Prior acquaintance between nodes can be considered as pre-trust relationships 
between nodes.  However, the ad hoc nature of these networks does not allow for these 
assumptions, as it cannot be assumed that secrets exist between the respective pair of nodes 
[Eschenauer & Gligor, 2002].  If nodes can join and leave the network at random without 
prior trust relationships with nodes, access control becomes a difficult task for the security 
mechanism.  
d. Multi-hop communication channel 
Wired networks include fixed nodes and fixed wired communication lines.  Wireless ad hoc 
networks have mobile wireless nodes (often in the form of hand held devices) and, as 
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suggested, their communication medium is wireless. This allows for greater network 
availability and easy network deployment.  Each node’s transmission range is limited and 
network communication is realized through multi-hop paths.  Co-operation and trust along 
these paths is a crucial aspect of the security mechanism and ensures successful 
communication. The shared wireless communication medium means that any user can 
participate in the network.  This creates access control problems for security mechanisms as 
adversaries are able eavesdrop on communication or launch active attacks to alter message 
data. 
e. Mobility 
Nodes are expected to be mobile within an ad hoc network, creating a dynamic and 
unpredictable network environment.  In certain situations the nodes’ mobility is not totally 
unsystematic and assumptions can be made in the form of mobility patterns [Capkun et al, 
2006].  An example of these patterns is evident in a vehicular ad hoc network where vehicles 
move along fixed paths, or roads, at speeds which have a high probability of being within 
the local speed limit. However, nodes demonstrate random mobility within these 
predictions [Capkun et al, 2006]. 
Connectivity between nodes is sporadic. This is due to the shared, error-prone wireless 
medium and frequent route failures which caused by the unpredictable mobility of nodes 
[Van der Merwe & Dawoud, 2005]. Increased mobility can result in the multi-hop 
communication paths being broken and network services becoming unavailable.  Security 
mechanisms must account for the weak connectivity and unavailability. Furthermore, due to 
mobility and sporadic connectivity, these mechanisms must also aim to be scalable with the 
changing network density.    
f. Resource Limitations 
Wireless nodes allow for the freedom of mobility and easy network establishment and 
deployment.  Wireless nodes are often smaller hand-held devices that do not experience the 
same resource privileges of traditional wired nodes [Hass et al, 2002].  Mobile nodes are 
ideally low cost and small in size as to maximize node availability and mobility.  In attempt 
to achieve these objectives wireless nodes have limited resource, specifically in the following 
areas: 
‚ Battery life 
‚ Communication range 
‚ Bandwidth 
‚ Computational capacity 
‚ Memory resources 
If mobility is to be attained, nodes must be battery powered.  Battery powered nodes suffer 
from the consequences of power failures which break connectivity.  They also run a high 
possibility of failing to be on-line the entire duration of the network. This could hinder 
network service availability. Cost and power restrictions limit the design features of wireless 
nodes. Power and transmission range are directly related, resulting in wireless devices 
having limited transmission ranges and bandwidths. Low powered, low cost CPU’s are 
preferred, as this reduces the computational capacity and memory resources available for 
routing and security operations.  As discussed above, network and security tasks are not 
performed by a central authority, but rather distributed among all the nodes.  This creates a 
heavy burden upon the nodes to perform their own tasks as well as the network services.  If 
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the security mechanisms do not distribute the load fairly, adversaries can act in a selfish 
manner, forcing other nodes to perform extra tasks.  In some instances malicious nodes will 
flood a single node with service requests in the aim of depleting its limited resources.  A 
well designed security algorithms optimizes computational processing and operation to 
meet the limited resource requirements of these dynamic networks. 
g. Physical Vulnerability 
Another challenge in ad hoc networks is the physical vulnerability of nodes.  In a mobile ad 
hoc network nodes are mobile and often small devices. This contributes to a higher 
probability of being capture or compromised when compared to traditional wired networks 
with stationary entities [Lidong &Zygmunt, 1999]. This means that wireless ad hoc networks 
are more prone to insider attacks and security mechanisms and must be designed with this 
in mind. An inside attacker could analyze the node to gain secret keying information or use 
the node to compromise other nodes. The same threats exist in wired formal networks. 
Although they may rely on a secure host to detect and recover compromised nodes. 
Sensitive security information may also be stored on that host, minimizing the consequences 
upon the network if a single node is captured.  In an attempt to enhance security within 
hybrid ad hoc networks [Salem et al, 2005] a fixed architecture is combined with a volatile 
distributive architecture.   
2.3 Security objectives and services 
Securing mobile ad hoc networks requires certain services to be met.  A security service is a 
made available by a protocol which ensures sufficient security for the system or the data 
transferred. The security objectives for mobile ad hoc networks are similar to that of fixed 
wired networks. The security objects are described in six categories, adapted from 
discussions in [Stalling, 2003]: 
‚ Authentication 
‚ Access Control 
‚ Data Confidentiality 
‚ Data Integrity 
‚ Non-repudiation 
‚ Availability Services 
2.4 Attacks 
Threats or attacks upon the network come from entities. They are known as adversaries.  
Mobile ad hoc networks inherit all the threats of wired and wireless networks. With these 
networks’ unique characteristics, new security threats are also introduced [Zhou & Haas, 
1999]. Before the development of security protocols, it is essential to study the attacks 
associated with these unique networks. 
a. Attack characteristics 
Attacks will be launched against either the vulnerable characteristics of a mobile ad hoc 
network or against its security mechanisms. Attacks against the security mechanism in all 
types of networks, including mobile ad hoc networks, include authentication and secret key 
sabotage.  Mobile ad hoc networks have distinctive characteristics, as identified in Section 
2.2. Attackers are expected to target these points of vulnerability, for example the multi-hop 
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nature of communication routes.  The attacks are classified by their different characters. The 
attacks, accordingly, are classified as follows: 
Passive and Active Attacks 
Security attacks can be classified by the terms active and passive [Stalling, 2002]. Passive 
attacks attempt to steal information from the network without altering the system resources.  
Examples of passive attacks include, eavesdropping attacks and traffic analysis attacks. It is 
difficult to detect passive attacks as they leave no traceable affect upon the system resources 
or network functionality.  Although the results or the need for securing against these attacks 
may not be monitored or visibly present, it is still a priority to protect networks from these 
seemingly harmless attacks, particularly in a military context. Concerning this point, Bruce 
[Bruce, 2003] mentioned: “If security is too successful, or perfect then the security expenditures are 
seen as wasteful because success is too invisible”. However, Schneier assures one that, despite 
the lack of visible results, the need to secure information still exists. 
Active attacks attempt to modify system resources or network functionality.  Examples of 
these attacks are message modification, message replay, impersonation and denial of service 
attacks. 
Insider and Outsider Attacks 
Malicious nodes are not authorized participants in the network, which launch outsider 
attacks. Impersonation, packet insertion, and denial of service are some examples of 
outsider attacks. In contrast to outsider attackers, inside attackers are more difficult to 
defend against.  Inside attacks are launched from nodes which are authorized participants in 
the network.  Insider attacks are common in pure mobile ad hoc network, where any user 
can freely join or exit. Security mechanism become vulnerable when participates are 
malicious and the confidentiality of keying information can be compromised. Thus, an 
advantage of the non-repudiation and authentication techniques, malicious insider nodes 
can be identified and excluded. 
Layer Attacks  
There are threats at each layer of the mobile ad hoc network communication protocol. The 
physical layer is vulnerable to passive and active attacks. The attacks found at the physical 
layer are as follows: eavesdropping; denial of service; and physical hardware alterations.  
Encrypting the communication links and using tamper-resistant hardware helps to protect 
the physical layer. However, at the data link layer adversaries can flood the communication 
links with unnecessary data to deplete network resources. Security mechanisms that 
provide authentication and non-repudiation can prevent this, as they allow invalid packets 
transfers to be identified.  At the application layer messages are exchanged in an end-to-end 
manner using wireless multi-hop routes established by the network layer. The wireless 
multi-hop routes are invisible to the application layer. Conventional security techniques 
used for wired networks can be used to prevent expected attacks upon the application layer.  
The application layer is dependent upon the network layer to provide secure routes between 
the two communicating parties. 
The network layer provides a critical service to the mobile ad hoc network, and the routing 
protocol.  In the context of trust and security, the provision of secure routes is one of the 
most vital elements for trust establishment. 
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b. Attack Types 
The different types of attacks are identified and described below. While there is a focus on the 
networking layer, attacks such as impersonation and denial of services can occur on any layer.   
Wormhole attack 
In a wormhole attack a compromised node receives packets at one place in the network. The 
attacker tunnels the packets to another destination (i.e. an external attacker) in the network, 
where the packets are resent back into the network [Qian & Li, 2007].  The tunnel created by 
the adversary is known as a wormhole. A wormhole allows adversaries to disturb the 
routing protocol, by intercepting routing messages and creating denial of service attacks.  If 
the routing mechanism is not protected against such an attack mobile ad hoc routing 
protocols may fail to find valid routes. 
Black hole attack 
During route discovery a malicious node may falsely advertise itself as possessing the 
optimal route to the requested destination.  The adversary, therefore, attracts all routing 
messages.  The attacker then creates a black hole attack by dropping all routing packets, and 
disrupting the routing protocol and discovery phase. 
Byzantine attack 
During this type of attack a malicious node, or a group of malicious nodes, will launch 
attacks on the routing protocol. The aim is to direct routing packets to follow: non-optimal 
routes; routing loops; and selective dropping of packets [Awerbuch et al, 2002].  Byzantine 
behaviour is difficult to detect. A network could be operating with byzantine failures and be 
unaware of the attack on its routing mechanism. 
Eavesdropping 
An eavesdropping attack involves message or routing packet monitoring. It is a passive 
attack on the mobile ad hoc network.  Eavesdropping attacks are performed by adversaries 
and can reveal confidential information about the network regarding: its topology; 
geographical locations; or optimal routes in the network.  Attackers can use this information 
to launch other attacks at identified points of vulnerability. All networks are prone to 
passive eavesdropping attacks. It is the nature of wireless, mobile ad hoc networks that 
make them more vulnerable.  In wireless networks adversaries do not need a physical wired 
communication link to monitor the routing packets. The wireless communication medium 
allows for any users, within range, to analyze the traffic. Attackers can also exploit the 
multi-hop nature of routes in mobile ad hoc networks. An adversary can position itself 
along a route path and forwarding the routing messages along the multi-hop path. This 
allows adversaries to also analyze every packet that is forwarded along the path.  
Eavesdropping is a common problem in networks and encryption techniques can protect 
routing protocols from these attacks. 
Packet Replay 
Like eavesdropping, replay is a passive attack where data is captured by monitoring 
adversaries. Old routing messages are then retransmitted to other nodes disturbing the 
routing process.  Adversaries can, therefore, cause other node’s routing tables to be updated 
with outdated information. Malicious attackers can also record authorized routing messages 
and replay them to gain unauthorized access to protected nodes. 
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Resource consumption attack 
Mobile ad hoc nodes are restricted by their limited resources.  Attackers exploit this by 
launching attacks that consume a node’s resources hindering them from network 
participation. Resources targeted by attackers are: bandwidth, computational power and 
battery life. 
Sleep deprivation attacks, are resource attacks which are, specifically aimed against mobile ad 
hoc node’s battery power.  Node’s attempt to save power by going into a sleep mode, where a 
periodic scanning occurs and less battery power is used.  Sleep deprivation attacks prevent 
nodes from going into sleep mode therefore draining the battery life and disabling the node 
itself. Attackers will flood a target node with redundant routing requests or routing packets to 
be processed, thereby keeping the node and its resources unnecessarily busy. 
Packet replication is another type of resource attack where adversaries duplicate out of date 
packets and re-transmit them. This not only consumes battery life, bandwidth and 
computational power, but also disrupts the routing protocol. 
Sleep deprivation attacks, flooding attacks and packet replication result in the depletion of 
precious resources. If this is not protected against, it will result in nodes and services 
becoming unavailable in the network. 
Routing Table Poisoning 
Malicious nodes will target the routing table in an attempt to sabotage the establishment of 
routes. One such attack is the routing table poisoning attack where malicious nodes send 
counterfeit routing updates or modify existing routing updates.  This results in conflicting 
link information, unnecessary traffic congestion or denial of service. 
Rushing attack 
Mobile ad hoc networks that use on-demand routing protocols are vulnerable to rushing 
attacks [Hu et al, 2003a].  On-demand routing protocols, such as AODV [Perkins et al, 2003] 
and DSDV [Perkins & Bhagwat, 1994], use route request messages to discover the optimal 
route to a destination node. The network is flooded with route request messages. These 
messages are forwarded until the optimal route is found between the source and destination 
nodes. An adversary that receives a route request performs a rush attack by hurriedly 
flooding the network with that route request before other nodes, receiving the same route 
request, can respond. When other nodes receive the legitimate routing request, it is assumed 
to be a duplicate of the request which is distributed by the adversary, and the legitimate 
routing request is dropped. Therefore, the adversary will become part of the route that is 
discovered. This will result in an overall, insecure route. 
Selfish attack 
Misbehaving nodes will act in a greedy or selfish manner, resisting cooperating or 
participating in the network operations.  This is a denial of service and the attack causes the 
nodes to refuse to make their resources available.  Selfish nodes do not cooperate in network 
operations that do not benefit them. Rather they conserve their limited resources, such as 
battery life. Nodes may refuse to forward route request packets or turn off their devices 
when they are not transmitting data. The distributive architecture and multi-hop nature of 
mobile ad hoc networks means the network relies upon node cooperation [Molva & 
Michardi, 2003].  A security protocol should ensure fair distribution of network operation in 
order to provide reliable network services, and prevent node’s resources becoming depleted 
because of selfish node attacks. 
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Impersonation 
Impersonation attacks are also known as masquerading or spoofing attacks. The attacks 
occur when adversaries take the identity of an authorized node and breach the security of 
the network. Masquerading nodes are able to receive routing packets destined for other 
nodes. Mobile ad hoc networks can help protect against impersonation attacks by 
authenticating their routing messages.  
Pure mobile ad hoc networks are more vulnerable as they have no access control.  If there is 
no strong binding between the physical entity and the network identity, malicious nodes 
can adopt different identities. A severe attack which is prone to mobile ad hoc networks is 
the Sybil attack [Hashmi & Brooke, 2008] [Douceur, 2002]. A single adversary node launches 
a Sybil attack by adopting multiple identities and participating in the network with all 
identities at once. The result of such an attack gives the attacker a majority vote or 
considerable control in the network.  
2.5 Security model 
A security model for mobile ad hoc networks is illustrated, in general terms, in Figure 2. A 
message M is to be transmitted from the source A, across a network of nodes, to a 
destination node B. The two entities who are primary participants must collaborate for the 
transaction to occur. A routing protocol establishes a multi hop route between the primary 
 
 
Fig. 2. General Security Model 
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participants. The multi-hop route will involve secondary participating nodes. Security is 
provided by two accompanying techniques: a security related transformation applied to the 
message (resulting in an encrypted message C) and secret keying information shared by the 
principal participants. 
The general mobile ad hoc security model shows four basic tasks for a security mechanism: 
1. The design of a security algorithm. 
2. Generation of secret keying material used in conjunction with this security algorithm. 
3. Distribution of secret keying material. 
4. Protocol for the participants to follow which will achieve the required security services. 
Tasks 1 and 2 deal with the cryptographic algorithm used to provide security services.  It is 
widely recognized that existing cryptographic technology can provide sufficiently strong 
security mechanisms to ensure routing message confidentiality, authentication and 
integrity.  The establishment of these security mechanisms is a dynamic problem in wireless 
ad hoc networks, as this network cannot adopt the same approaches of its wired 
predecessors. The focus of this chapter is upon tasks 3 and 4: the establishment of the 
security protocols in the mobile ad hoc environment.  
3. Key management in mobile ad hoc networks 
In Section-2 we discussed the different types of attacks upon wireless ad hoc networks. In 
this section the techniques used to prevent these malicious attacks and specifically key 
management techniques, will be looked at. Security solutions which use cryptographic 
techniques rely on proper key management to establish trust. This chapter focuses upon key 
management which aids these cryptographic solutions. 
3.1 Description of key management 
In any communication network, the cryptographic network security is dependent on proper 
key management. Mobile ad hoc networks vary significantly from standard wired networks.  
A specific efficient key management system is required to realize security in these networks. 
Key management is defined as a set of procedures employed to administrate the 
establishment and maintenance of secure key base relationship. The purposes of key 
management, as stated by Menezes et al [Menezes et al, 1996b], is to: 
1. Initialize system users within a network. 
2. Generate, distribute and install keying material. 
3. Control the use of keying material within the network. 
4. Update, revoke, destroy and maintain keying material. 
5. Store, backup and recover keying material. 
Key management systems are responsible for the secure distribution of keys to their 
intended destinations.  Keys which are required to remain secret must be distributed in a 
way that ensures confidentiality, authenticity and integrity.  For example, in symmetric key 
cryptography both, or all, the participants must receive the key securely. For asymmetric 
key cryptography, the key management system must ensure that private keys are kept 
secret and only delivered to the required, authorized participants. Public keys do not 
require confidentiality but, authentication and integrity is vital. The key management 
system must protect confidentiality and authenticity of the keys. This system must also 
prevent unauthorized use of keys, for example the use of keys which are out-dated and 
invalid.   
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Cryptographic algorithms can provide confidentiality, authentication and integrity. 
However, the primary goal of key management is to guarantee that the secret keying 
material is shared among the specific communicating participants securely. There are 
several methodologies of sharing the keying material. The main approaches are: key 
transport; key arbitration; key pre-distribution; and key agreement [Menezes et al, 1996b]. 
a. Key Transport 
In a key transport system, one entity generates keys, or obtains keying material, and 
securely transports them to other entities in the network. The simplest key transport method 
is the key encrypting key method (KEK). This method assumes a prior shared key exists 
among the participating nodes. The prior shared key is used to encrypt new keys and 
transport them to all participating nodes. Prior shared keying relationships cannot be 
assumed in networks, especially in mobile ad hoc networks.  If a public key infrastructure 
exists, then the new keys can be encrypted by the respective receiver’s public key and 
transported without the existence of prior keying relationships. This approach assumes the 
existence of a trust third party (TTP) member which transports all the keying material. In 
pure mobile ad hoc networks a TTP member would not be available.  Shamir’s three-pass 
protocol [Shamir, 1979] is a key transport method, without prior shared keys. 
b. Key Arbitration 
A key arbitration system is a division of key transportation. In key arbitration a central 
arbitrator is assigned to create and distribute keys to all participants. The arbiter is often a 
wired node with no resource constraints.  In mobile ad hoc networks nodes are wireless 
with resource constraints. The arbiter would be required to be online throughout the 
network communication and be accessible to every member in the network. This is difficult 
in mobile ad hoc networks because of the resource constraints such as: bandwidth; 
transmission range; and energy. A solution to these potential problems is a distributive 
system, where the arbiter is replicated at different nodes. Simple replication of the arbiter 
has severe resource expenses on certain nodes and creates multiple points of vulnerability in 
the network.  If a single replicated arbiter is compromised the entire network can be at risk. 
c. Key Pre-distribution 
Keys are distributed to all participating member before the start of communication.  Key 
pre-distribution requires prior knowledge of all participating nodes.  Its implementation is 
simple and involves much less computation than other schemes.  This method is suitable for 
mobile ad hoc sensor networks, as they have highly restrictive resource capabilities. The set 
of sensor nodes is also established before the network is deployed and data is tracked.  Once 
the network is deployed there is no service which allows for new members to join or for 
keys to be changed.  This method is extended by allowing sub-groups of communication to 
form in the network. Similarly, the decision is made prior to deployment, and not during 
communication. 
d. Key Agreement 
Key agreement is used to enable two participants to agree upon a secret key.  In this way, 
keys are shared and establish a secure communication line over which a session can be run.   
Key agreement schemes are often based on asymmetric key cryptography and have high 
computational complexity, but little pre-configuration required. The most widely used key 
agreement scheme is the Diffie-Hellman key exchange [Steiner et al, 1996]. This is an 
asymmetric keying approach based on discrete logarithms. 
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3.2 Key management in mobile ad hoc networks  
Ad hoc wireless networks have unique characteristics and challenges, which do not allow 
the simple replication of conventional key management methods that are used for wired 
networks. Mobile ad hoc network’s lack of infrastructure poses the greatest threat to the 
establishment of a secure key management scheme.  Fixed infrastructure such as: a trusted 
third party member; an administrative support or certificate authority; dedicated routers; or 
fixed reliable communication links, cannot be assumed in wireless ad hoc networks.  Unique 
solutions are required for such unique networks. The focus of this chapter is around the 
investigation of the existing key management schemes for mobile ad hoc networks. 
Key management schemes are investigated with regard to: functionality; scalability; 
availability; security services; efficiency; and computational cost. A key management 
solution, which is scalable, will effectively provide security services in a network which 
dynamically changes in size, as nodes join and leave the network.  Availability is essential 
for a network whose topology is rapidly changing. Nodes should have easy access to 
authority members and keying services. A high priority is given to a key management 
solution that can successfully and efficiently provide crucial security services for the keying 
material.  Such services include: key confidentiality; key authenticity; key integrity; and 
fresh key updates. These services are congruent with the security services described in 
Section 2.    
Of the existing key management solutions, asymmetric cryptography is predominately used 
when managing trust via a public key infrastructure (PKI) of some sort. Existing PKI 
schemes utilize either the: hierarchical or web-of-trust model. 
a. Hierarchical Trust models 
The hierarchical trust models are more structured, as they use a PKI and a certificate 
authority as a source of trust. The certificate authority (CA) is a trusted entity used to verify; 
issue; and revoke certificates, therefore enabling successful public key cryptography.  A key 
management service for public key cryptography would include the certificate authority 
service which has a public key, K, and private key, k. The CA’s public key is distributed to 
all the nodes in the network. The nodes know that any certificate signed by the CA’s private 
key may be trusted.  Each node also has its own public/private key pair, which allows for 
nodal communication.  The CA stores the public keys of all the network nodes and 
distributes the respective keys to the nodes that request to setup a secure communication 
with another node [William, 1999].  A fixed CA is not considered in this investigation, due 
to the limitations caused by no TTP. 
The CA distributes trust in a hierarchical manner, as seen in Figure 3. A root CA issues 
certificates to delegated CA’s or end users. The CA can issue certificates to user nodes or other 
CA nodes.  The PKI X.509 framework is an example of such an infrastructure [Stalling, 2003]. 
The following types of hierarchal trust models have been investigated in the context of 
mobile ad hoc networks: 
1. Off-line trusted third party models: use a trusted outside entity to achieve a large portion 
of the key management tasks. 
2. Partially distributed certificate authority models: distribute the functionality of the CA to a 
small set of nodes. 
3. Fully distributed certificate authority models: are self organized models, which are similar 
to the previous distribute to the CA. However, this model is across the entire network 
in a self organized manner. 
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4. Cluster based model: is a special kind of hierarchical trust in the form of group 
authentication, where clustered groups of nodes are treated as single trust entities and 
authenticated as a group. 
 
 
Fig.  3. Hierarchical trust 
b. Web-of-Trust Models 
The Pretty Good Privacy model (PGP) [Abdul-Rahman, 1997], also known as a “web-of-
trust-model”, enables nodes to act as independent certification authorities. There is no 
distinction between a CA and an end user node.  Nodes provide individual trust opinions of 
other nodes, thereby creating a “web of trust”, as illustrated in Figure 4. Each user node is 
the “centre of its own world” and is responsible for certificate management. The advantage 
of a PGP model is its dynamic, autonomous nature, which is seemingly ideal for application 
in decentralized environments such as ad hoc networks [Davis, 2004]. 
 
 
Fig. 4. PGP web-of-trust 
Certificates are issued by the nodes themselves. However, a public certificate directory is 
required for their distribution. This directory is often located at an online, centralized, 
trusted third party entity. This makes the PGP model unsuitable for ad hoc network 
application. Steps are needed to be taken to localize such directories and realize certificate 
distribution. The autonomous nature of the “web-of-trust” model means that it is more 
susceptible to malicious attackers than to more structured networks. For example, if one 
entity is compromised a corrupt set of certificates is filtered throughout the network.  The 
self issued certificate model is investigated as a foundation for PGP based solutions in 
mobile ad hoc networks. Figure 5 illustrates the key management solutions investigated in 
this chapter. 
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3.3 Off-line trusted third party models 
A progress trust negotiation scheme was introduced by Verma [Verma et al, 2001].  It is a 
hierarchical trust model where authentication is preformed locally, but an off-line trusted 
third party performs trust management tasks like the issuing of certificates.  The off-line 
trusted third party also manages the certificate revocation process.  This scheme is extended 
through a localized trust management scheme proposed by Davis [Davis, 2004].  Davis 
attempts to localize Verma’s solution. The only trust management task that is not 
implemented locally is the issuing of the certificates. 
 
 
Fig. 5. Key Management Solutions 
a.  System Overview 
Each node possesses its own private key and the trusted third party’s public key. The 
maintenance of these keys is the responsibility of each node. Trust is established when the 
trustor provides the trustee with a certificate that has not expired, or has not been revoked 
and the trustee can verify it with the trusted third party’s public key (possessed by the 
trustee). Furthermore, to realize certificate revocation, each node must possess two 
certificate tables: a status and profile table. The profile table, illustrated in Figure 6, describes 
the conduct or behaviour of each node. The status table describes the status of the certificate, 
i.e. revoked or valid.  These two tables are maintained locally by the nodes themselves, with 
the purpose of maintaining consistent profiles. 
 
Off-line TTP Model 
Partially Distributed CA 
Cluster-based Group 
Model
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Davis’s scheme is a fully distributed scheme. It requires that a node broadcasts its 
certificates and its profile table to all the nodes in the network. It also requires that each 
node’s profile table be kept updated, and distributed with synchronization of data content.  
The profile table contains information from which the user node may define if a certificate 
can be trusted or of it must be revoked.  Node i’s profile table stores three pieces of data: 
1. Accusation info: the identity of nodes that have accused node i of misbehaving. 
2. Peer n ID: the identity of nodes that node i has accused, acting almost as a CRL 
(certificate revocation list). 
3. Certificate status: a 1-bit flag indicating the revocation status of the certificate. 
The fully distributed information in the profile tables should be consistent. If there is any 
inconsistency detected, an accusation is expected to be launched against the node in 
question.  Inconsistent data can be defined as data which differs from the majority of data. 
 
Fig. 6. Profile Table 
The status table is then used to calculate the certificates status, i.e. revoked or not revoked.  
The node i’s status table stores and analysis the following factors: Ai (total number of 
accusations against node i); ai (total number of accusations made by node i) ; N (expected 
maximum number of nodes in the network).  These factors are used to calculate the weight 
of node i’s accusation and the weight of other nodes accusations against node i. A revocation 
quotient is then calculated, Rj, as a function of the sum of the weighted accusations. It is then 
compared to a network defined revocation threshold RT.  If Rj > RT then the node i’s 
certificate is revoked. 
b.  Analysis 
This scheme uses a hierarchical trust model which relies upon an off-line trusted third party 
for aspects of key management. The off-line trust third party is to be resident as a trusted 
source if required. This scheme assumes the existence of a trusted off-line entity which 
initializes certificates, and securely distributes them amongst the network participants. This 
scheme is a pre-distributive key exchange model. It provides robust security; however, its 
implementation is more realistic within a hybrid infrastructure.  A key management scheme 
with a hybrid infrastructure is a scheme which makes use of both wired and wireless 
architecture.  A wired trusted off-line node performs all or a portion of the key management 
services to maximise security and efficiency. Hybrid infrastructures allow for greater 
security and a simple solution to the central problem of key distribution in mobile ad hoc 
networks. 
Verma and Davis’s solution does not specify that a wired node be the off-line authority for 
key pre-distribution. Nevertheless, a separate trusted entity capable of intense computation, 
high security and network distribution must exist for the success of Verma and Davis’s 
model.  Such assumptions cannot be made in pure mobile ad hoc networks. The hybrid 
nature of Davis’s solution is displayed in Figure 7. 
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Verma localizes the task of authentication. Davis goes one step further by localizing the 
revocation module of the scheme by proactively maintaining accusation information in 
profile tables and locally, calculating revocation decisions. This scheme mitigates against 
malicious accusation exploits. This could result in a node being revoked based on single 
malicious offender’s broadcast information. To solve this problem one must not treat all 
accusations equally, but rather use a sum of weighted accusations, which are calculated 
before the node is revoked. Davis’s scheme succeeds in taking steps toward self-
organization in ad hoc network trust establishment as it provides a protocol that enables 
revocation of certificates, without continual trusted third party involvement. 
 
 
Fig. 7. Hybrid progressive trust negotiation scheme 
3.4 Partially distributed certificate authority  
The solution proposed by Zhou and Haas [Zhou & Hass, 1999] allows for the functionality 
of the certificate authority to be shared amongst a set of nodes in the network. This solution 
aims to create the illusion of an existing trusted third party.  Zhou and Haas’s proposal in 
1999 was instrumental in the initial research of key management solutions for ad hoc 
networks.  This approach has been extended to incorporate the heterogeneous nature of 
nodes in [Yi & Kravets, 2001]. 
a.  System overview 
The CA’s public key, K, is known by all nodes (m) and the CA’s private key, k, is divided 
and shared by n nodes where n < m.  The distributed CA signs certificates by recreating the 
private key via a t threshold group signature method.  Each CA node has a partial signature. 
The CA’s signature is successfully created when t correct partial signatures are combined, at 
a combiner node.  To prevent the distributed CA nodes from becoming compromised and 
the authentication becoming compromised, a preventive proactive scheme is implemented 
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Fig. 8. Partially Distributed Certificate Authority 
b.  Threshold Scheme 
Threshold cryptography is used to share the CA service between nodes. A threshold 
cryptography scheme allows the sharing of cryptographic functionality. A (t-out-of-n) 
threshold scheme allows n nodes to share the cryptographic capability. However, it requires 
t nodes, from the n node set, to successfully perform the CA’s functionality jointly.  Potential 
attackers need to corrupt t authority nodes, before being able to exploit the CA’s 
functionality and analyze secret keying information. Therefore, a (t-out-of-n) threshold 
scheme tolerates t-1 compromised nodes, from the n node set [Aram et al, 2003]. 
When applying threshold cryptography to the shared CA problem, the CA service is shared 
by n nodes across the network called authority nodes. The private key k, crucial for digital 
signatures, is split into n parts (k1,k2,k3,…,kn) assigning each part to an authority node (an).  










Partially distributed CA nodes 
Participating nodes 
CA availability 
169li i il : t
www.intechopen.com
Mobile Ad-Hoc Networks: Applications 170 
stores the public keys of all the network nodes (including other authority nodes).  Nodes 
wanting to set-up secure communication with node i need only request the public key of 
node i (Ki) from the closest authority node - therefore increasing the CA’s availability.  For 
the CA service to sign and verify a certificate, each authority node produces a partial digital 
signature using its respective private key, kp, and then submit the partial digital signature to 
a combining node. Any node may act as a combiner in the ad hoc network.  The partial 
digital signatures are combined at a combiner (c) to create the signature for the certificate, t 
correct partial digital signatures are required to create a successful signature.  Therefore, 
protecting the network against corrupt authority nodes, up to t-1 corrupt authority nodes 
may be tolerated [Lidong & Zygmunt, 1999]. 
For example, Figure 10 shows a (2-out-of-3) threshold scheme where the message m is signed 
by the CA, two partial signatures (PS) are accepted, while the third (an2) was corrupted.  The 
partial signatures meet the threshold requirements and the partial signatures are combined 
at c and applied to the message. 
 
Fig. 9. (2-out-of-3) Threshold Key Management 
 
 
Fig. 10. (2-out-of-3) Threshold Signature 
c.  Proactive security 
Threshold cryptography increases the availability and security of the network by de-
centralizing the CA.  Security is maintained with the assumption that all CA authority nodes 
cannot be simultaneously corrupt. 
It is possible for a malicious attacker to compromise all the CA’s authority nodes over time.  
An adversary of this type is then able to gain the CA’s sensitive keying information.  
Proactive schemes [Van der Merwe & Dawoud, 2004] [Herzberg et al, 1997] [Frankel et al, 
1997] [Jarecki, 1995] are implemented to avoid such adversaries. 
A proactive threshold cryptography scheme uses share refreshing. This enables CA 
authority nodes to compute new key shares from old ones, without disclosing the CA’s 
k
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public/private key. The new key shares make a new (t-out-of-n) sharing of the CA’s 
public/private key pair. These are independent of the old pair [Herzberg et al, 1995]. 
Share refreshing relies on the following mathematical property: 
If (s11 , s21 , … ,sn1) is a (t-out-of-n) sharing of k1 and (s12 , s22 , … ,sn2) is a (t-out-of-n) sharing of 
k2, then (s11 + s12 , s21 + s22, … ,sn1 + sn2) is a (t-out-of-n) sharing of k1 + k2 . Therefore if k2 is 0, 
then we get a new (t-out-of-n) sharing of k1. 
The share refreshing scheme is applied to a threshold CA. A threshold CA is a (t-out-of-n) 
system that shares the CA’s private key k among n authority nodes (an1 , … , ann) each with a 
share of the CA’s private key. To generate a new (t-out-of-n) sharing (an1’, … , ann’) of k, each 
authority node ani generates sub-shares (ani1 , ani2 , … , anin) a (t-out-of-n) sharing of 0, which 
represents the i’th column, as seen in Figure 11.  Each sub-share anij is sent to the authority 
node anj. When authority node anj has received all sub-shares (an1j , an2j , … , annj), which 
represents the jth row, seen in Figure 11,  it then generates its new share an1’ by using the 
mathematical property described above. 
 
 
Fig. 11. (t-out-of-n) Share Refreshing 
The communication of the sub-shares requires a secret redistribution protocol [Desmendt & 
Jajodia, 1997] [Chor et al, 1985] to ensure secure transmission. Note that share refreshing 
does not change the CA’s private key pair. Share refreshing may occur periodically and be 
extended to occur upon events. These events can include the detection of compromised 
nodes or a change in network topology.  Therefore, the key management service is able to 
transparently adapt itself to changes in the network and maintain secure communication. 
d. Heterogeneous Extension 
An extension to Zhou and Haas’s scheme can be seen in the Mobile Certificate Authority 
(MOCA) scheme by Yi and Kravets [Yi & Kravets, 2003]. The MOCA scheme also uses 
threshold cryptography to implement a public key, which is a partially distributed 
certificate authority solution.  The functionality of the certificate authority is distributed to n 
nodes, called MOCAs. The assumption is made that all nodes have heterogeneous visible 
qualities.  These visible qualities act as initial trust evidence and are used when selecting the 
an1 ani ann
an11 ani1 ann1 
anij an1j annj 
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MOCA nodes to distribute authority.  Such visible evidence can include: computational 
power; physical security; or position. This evidence is based on a trust decision and 
authority distributed, accordingly. Similar to Zhou and Haas’s scheme, nodes require t+1 
partial signatures from a set of n MOCAs to allow for certificate verification and trust 
relationship establishment, with a threshold of t.  The MOCA scheme further builds on 
Zhou and Haas’s solution by adding a revocation of certificates.  Certificate revocation lists 
are stored at each MOCA. For certificates to be revoked, t+1 MOCAs must sign a revocation 
certificate request with t+1 partial signatures from the MOCAs. Once the partial signatures 
are gathered, the certificate revocation list is updated. Malicious nodes wanting to 
unnecessarily revoke another node’s certificate can only do so with the approval of t+1 
trusted MOCAs, therefore ensuring the reputation of each node’s certificate.  
e. Analysis 
This solution demonstrates some of the problems of an ad hoc network. Despite its obvious 
weaknesses, it is noted as one of the earliest key management solutions to ad hoc networks.   
The partial distributive scheme proposed by Zhou and Haas requires that an off-line TTP 
member exists at the initialization phase in order to establish the distributive CA. The off-
line TTP: generates the threshold private key; shares it among the appointed CA authority 
nodes; and distributes the CA’s public key to all participating nodes in the network. All 
certificate related tasks including signatures, generation, distribution, refreshing and 
revocation, are performed by the participating nodes without the involvement of a TTP.  
The off-line TTP is not as involved in Verma [Verma et al, 2001] and Davis’s [Davis, 2004] 
proposals. However, in spontaneous ad hoc networks such a trusted entity cannot be 
assumed at initialization. 
The advantage of distributing the CA allows for the functionality of the CA to be distributed 
among the nodes. This avoids single point attacks and allows the computational overhead of 
the CA’s services to be distributed. Although the CA is distributed, it still remains 
centralised between a few nodes. 
The centralization of authority creates availability issues. The availability issues are sensitive 
as communicating nodes require communicating with t authority nodes before acquiring a 
signature.  The CA’s availability is dependent on the threshold parameters t and n. These 
parameters must be selected to provide a suitable trade-off between: availability; security; 
and cost of computation. The larger the threshold (t), the higher the security, but, the 
availability will pay the cost.  The centralization of authority also results in a select group of 
nodes carrying the burden of security computations. This breaks the value of fair 
distribution in a network. 
This solution requires that the CA authority nodes store all the certificates issued, which 
necessitates a costly synchronization mechanism. Furthermore, a share refreshing or 
proactive method is required. This is achieved by using a secret redistribution protocol 
[Desmendt & Jajodia, 1997]. With this in place, it is, therefore, certain that all the CA 
authority nodes are not compromised. The procedure of synchronization, updating and 
proactive refreshing is costly to resource constrained nodes. 
Another potential problem is related to network participants addressing the CA authority 
nodes.  A node requesting a service from the CA entity is required to contact t out of n 
nodes.  The CA can then be given a multicast address and participating nodes can multicast 
their requests to the CA. The CA authority nodes can then unicast replies to the requesting 
participant.  In ad hoc networks, which do not support multicasting, a participating node 
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can broadcast its request. This approach is more common in mobile ad hoc networks, 
despite its potential of a large amount of network traffic. 
Zhou and Haas’s partially distributed certificate authority approach provides much of the 
groundwork for future solutions through the implementation of threshold cryptography in 
ad hoc networks. 
3.5 Fully distributed certificate authority 
The threshold scheme, investigated in [Luo & Lu, 2000] [Luo et al, 2002], uses ideas 
proposed by the partial distributive threshold scheme, found in [Lidong &Zygmunt, 1999].  
Luo and Lu propose a scheme which embraces the distribution of the CA.  In a network of m 
nodes, the network and security services are shared across m nodes. Therefore, a fully 
distributed system is realized, as seen in Figure 12. This scheme further differs from [Lidong 
&Zygmunt, 1999] in that there is no need to select specialized nodal authorities, as all nodes 
perform this role. Like the partial distributive scheme, the fully distributive scheme includes 
the use of share refreshing. This allows proactive security against significant nodes that are 
compromised.  This scheme is designed for, and aimed at, long-term ad hoc networks which 
have the capacity to handle public key cryptography.   
a. System overview 
The Fully Distributive Certificate Authority scheme is a public key cryptography scheme. It 
takes the functionality of the certificate authority and distributes it across m nodes, where m is 
the total number of nodes in the network. This threshold scheme requires k or more nodes to 
act in collaboration to perform any operations of the CA.  The CA’s private key is divided and 
shared among all the participating nodes.  This effectively enhances availability and allows 
nodes that are requesting the CA, to contact any k one-hop neighbour nodes. It is assumed that 
each node will have more than k one-hop neighbours [Luo & Lu, 2000].  Therefore, only one-
hop certificate communication can occur. This allows for more reliable communication, in 
comparison with multi-hop communication. It is also easier to detect compromised nodes. 
Figure 12 illustrates the fully distributive network, where all nodes have a portion of authority 
in the form of a partial CA signature.  Figure 12 shows a network with threshold k=3, where 
nodes B, C and D can find a coalition of partial CA nodes to form a group authentication CA 
signature. Node A is unable to find a sufficient coalition of nodes. 
 
 






173li i il : t
www.intechopen.com
Mobile Ad-Hoc Networks: Applications 174 
b. Off-line Initialization 
The initial phase of [Luo & Lu, 2000] [Luo et al, 2002] requires an off-line trusted third party 
(TTP) to establish the initial set of nodes.  The off-line TTP will provide each node i with its 
own: certificate; the CA’s public key; and a share of the CA’s private key.  A certificate is a 
binding between a nodes ID and its public key.  The certificate is signed by CA’s private key 
kCA and can be verified by the CA’s public key KCA - which is made available to all the 
participating nodes.  The off-line TTP initialises the threshold private key to the first k nodes 
by the following steps: 
1. Generate the sharing polynomial f(x) = a0 + a1x + ... + ak-1xk-1  where a0 = kCA 
2. Securely distribute node i identified by IDi where 件 樺 倦 with its secret share Si = f(IDi) 
3. Broadcast k public witnesses of the sharing polynomial’s coefficients {月銚轍 ┸ ┼ ┸ 月銚入貼迭} and 
then the off-line TTP involvement is over. 
4. Each node with IDi that has received a secret share Si verifies it by checking the sharing 
polynomial’s coefficients such that   月聴日 噺 月銚轍 ぉ 岫月銚轍岻彫帖日 ぉ 岫月銚迭岻彫帖日鉄 ぉ ┼ ぉ 岫月銚入貼迭岻彫帖日入貼迭 . 
After the initial establishment of the shared secret key amongst the first k nodes, the TTP is 
no longer responsible for the full distribution of the CA’s private key.  The off-line TTP 
maintains the responsibility of issuing new nodes with their initial certificates binding, and 
as a result impersonation attacks are prevented. 
c.  On-line Shared Initialization 
New nodes entering the network need to be provided with their own share of the CA 
private key kCA so that they can be part of the signing process.  The participating nodes in 
the network perform this initialization process, without the interference of an off-line TTP.  
Shared initialization is modelled on Shamir’s threshold secret sharing scheme [Shamir, 
1979]. This scheme allows for a culmination of t nodes to initialize a joining node, with a 
share of the CA private key kCA.     
A node i, already initialized by the off-line authority, can generate a partial secret share Sp,i 
for a joining node p. The combination of k partial secret shares results in node p’s secret 
share Sp. This is a partial share of the CA’s private key. 
鯨椎 噺布鯨椎┸沈賃沈退怠 "" 
Node i’s secret share Si can be derived from each partial secret share Sp, which is sent to 
node p.  The joining node p must not be allowed to know the secret shares of other nodes, as 
this would breach confidentiality.  The aim is to hide the actual partial secret shares Sp,I, 
while still transporting the combined secret share Sp to node p.  A shuffling scheme is used 
to solve this problem.  The shuffling scheme is illustrated in Figure 13.  From Figure 13, 
nodes i and j wish to initialize node p with a secret share Sp.  Nodes i and j agree upon a 
shuffling factor dij.  The shuffling factor is combined with the partial secret shares Sp,i and 
Sp,j.  The sum of the shuffling factors is null. Therefore this allows for the secret share Sp to 
be calculated while hiding the secret shares of i and j.  Figure 13 illustrates a system with a 
threshold of two nodes, to scale this to k nodes. Each pair of contributing nodes must decide 
on a shuffling factor resulting in k(k-1)/2 shuffling factors which need to be distributed.  
This key transport mechanism is described in the following steps: 
1. Node p broadcast an initial request to a coalition of k neighbouring nodes. 
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Fig. 13. Shuffling scheme of partial secret sharing 
2. The coalition of nodes divides into i and j pairs and agree upon appropriate shuffling 
factors.  An associated public witness 月鳥日乳  is generated and signed to identify any 
misbehaviour.  The shuffling factor and the witnesses are sent to node p. 
3. Node p routes all the shuffling factors and witnesses to the k coalition nodes. 
4. Each coalition node j generates the partial secret share Sj,p and shuffles it with the 
shuffling factors received by p such that 鯨撤┸椎博博博博 噺 鯨珍┸椎 髪"デ 穴沈珍賃沈退怠  and sends 鯨撤┸椎博博博博 to p. 
5. Node p verifies the shuffled share values  鯨撤┸椎博博博博 by checking the public witnesses that 月聴剥┸妊博博博博博 噺 月聴妊テ 盤月鳥日乳匪賃沈退怠  .  If the verification is successful the shuffled share values are 
combines such that 鯨椎 噺 デ 鯨椎┸徹博博博博賃沈退怠  . 
After the joining node p has been issued with a part of the CA private key, it can perform the 
services of the CA in the network including certificate renewal and certificate revocation.  
System maintenance includes the initializing of joining nodes.  System maintenance also 
encompasses the renewal of certificates, certificate revocation and proactive updating of the 
CA private key shares, therefore protecting against the CA’s private key becoming 
compromised.   
d. Share Updating 
In a k threshold system, attacks can compromise k nodes over a period of time allow them to 
impersonate the CA and perform malicious communication attacks.  A solution to this is 
secret share updates by the use of a proactive security method, similar to that used in partial 
distributed certificate authority methods. 
The network will have an operation phase and an update phase where periodic updates will 
occur of the secret shares of the CA’s private key will be updated.  During the update phase 
all nodes participate in the updating procedure.  Each node will have an equal probability of 
initiating the update phase, therefore fairly distributing the load. The secret share update 
phase following the following steps: 
1. The node which is to initiate the update phase requests a coalition of k nodes and 
generates an update polynomial 血通椎鳥銚痛勅岫捲岻 噺 決怠捲 髪 決怠捲怠 髪橋髪 決怠捲賃貸怠 . 
2. Each co-efficient of the polynomial is signed by the coalition CA and flooded through 
the network such that each node possesses the 血通椎鳥銚痛勅岫捲岻 polynomial. 
3. Each node i generates its secret update share 鯨徹拍 噺 血通椎鳥銚痛勅岫荊経沈岻 and verifies it by a 
coalition of k nodes.  Each node in the coalition returns a partial update to node i who 
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combines them to form its update share. This update share is added to the current share 
and a new updated share of the CA’s private key is formed. 
The share update procedure provides robust security against multi-point attacks but 
security comes at a high computational cost. 
e. Certificate Renewal 
Certificate issuing is assumed to be handled by the off-line TTP, which registers, initialises, 
and certifies new nodes joining the network.  The issue of certificate renewal is performed 
by the distributed CA in the network.  Each nodes certificate is only valid for a specified 
time period, after which they must renew the certificate before it expires.  For successful 
certificate renewal in a k threshold fully distributive system, node i must request the renewal 
of certificate 系結堅建沈 from a coalition of k nodes. One-hop neighbours are identified as more 
trust worthy coalition members.  Each coalition node then generates a new partial signature 
and will send it to node i.  Node i then act as a combiner (all nodes may act as combiners in 
the fully distributive certificate authority scheme) and combines the k partial signatures to 
produce the new certificate 系結堅建徹博博博博博博博 [Luo &Lu, 2000].  In a similar manner, messages are signed 
by the coalition nodes and form a group signature as described in providing authenticity 
and security.   
f. Certificate Revocation 
Certificates can be revoked if nodes are found to be corrupt or compromised. This 
revocation service assumes that all nodes monitor their one-hop neighbour nodes and are 
capable of retaining their own certificate revocation list (CRL) [Luo & Lu, 2000].  When a 
user node identifies a neighbouring node is corrupt, it adds the node in question to its CRL 
and announces this to all neighbouring nodes.  The neighbouring nodes in turn check if this 
announcement is from a reliable source, i.e. the source is not on the receivers CRL. If the 
source is reliable, the announced node is marked as suspect.   If a threshold of k’s reliable 
accusation is made against a single node then the node’s certificate is revoked.  This 
procedure allows for compromised nodes to be identified and explicitly quarantined from 
CA involvement, until such a time as they have become secure again.  Implicit revocation is 
implemented by setting lifetimes for certificates tcert.  When the time has expired and the 
certificate has not been renewed it is implicitly revoked. 
g. Analysis 
This scheme is a hierarchical model. It is similar to the partially distributed certificate 
authority scheme. One can see that fully distributive networks possess similar weaknesses 
to partial distributive networks.  Both schemes require prior knowledge and an off-line TTP 
for the initialization of certificates.  The main advantages of the fully distributive scheme are 
its availability and implement revocation mechanism. 
The fully distributive nature of the CA allows for high availability.  It does require that each 
requesting node have k one-hop neighbours, which form a CA coalition.  The localization of 
the coalition to the one-hop neighbours avoids transitive trust and reduces network traffic. 
One can choose for the threshold parameter k to be larger, which will provide a higher level 
of security.  This change requires an attacker to compromise a larger number of nodes in 
order to obtain the CA’s private key.  Increased security comes at the cost of availability.  
This scheme is non-scalable, as it lacks a mechanism that increases the threshold parameter 
k, dynamically, as the network density increases. 
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As the CA is distributed through the network its availability is greatly increased. However, 
an increase in availability of the CA requires a greater security and more focus upon the 
proactive share refreshing scheme.  This scheme is a complex and computationally taxing 
maintenance protocol. It includes the share initialization and share update protocols.  The 
trade-off between security and resources is an important issue in wireless ad hoc networks. 
The revocation mechanism allows for explicit and implicit revocation, while the assumption 
is made that all nodes are computationally capable of monitoring the behaviour of their one-
hop neighbours.  However, this assumption may not be true for certain ad hoc networks. 
3.6 Cluster based model 
This solution investigates the Secure Pebblenets [Basagni, 2001], which is a cluster or group 
based scheme. This solution uses symmetric key cryptography. It is a hierarchical 
distributive key management system. The focus of this scheme provides group 
authentication for user nodes, as well as message integrity and confidentiality. Group 
authentication is achieved by grouping nodes into clusters and treating them with blanket 
authentication.  This solution is suited for planned, long-term distributed ad hoc networks.  
It is specifically aimed toward networks with low capacity nodes, which lack the resources 
to perform public key encryption. 
a. System overview 
This solution requires an initial infrastructure for setup.  A secret group identity key kG is 
set. This identity provides every node with authentication and integrity.  Its key is kept 
constant for the duration of the network - unless an off-line authority re-initializes the 
network.  kG is used to generate further keys to provide message confidentiality [Basagni, 
2001]. 
The life of the network is illustrated in Figure 14. The lifetime is divided into time slices, 
with three phases: the cluster generation phase; the operation phase; and the key update 
phase.  Each time slice consists of these three phases. A network with low processing 
capacity nodes, authentication is complex and costly. Therefore authentication, 
confidentiality and integrity are provided for nodal groups or clusters. This maximizes 
efficiency and minimizes computational cost. 
 
Fig. 14. Phases of the network lifetime 
b. Cryptographic keying material 
The network uses the following cryptographic keying material to provide message and 
group confidentiality and authentication: 
 tupdate 
Cluster Generation Phase 
Key Update Phase 
Operation Phase 
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1. Group identity key kGI is shared prior to network establishment between all network 
nodes and is used to derive additional keys for security services. 
2. Traffic encryption key kTEK is used for symmetric data encryption and is updated during 
the network lifetime. 
3. Cluster key kC is used for cluster specific communication. 
4. Backbone key kB is used to encrypt communication between cluster heads. 
5. Hello key kH is used between neighbours in cluster generation phase. 
The cluster key is generated by the cluster head. The kTEK is randomly generated by the key 
manager, who is selected in the key update phase. The group identity key is used to derive 
the backbone and hello keys in the following manner: 倦喋待 噺 倦弔彫 倦張沈 噺 月盤倦喋沈貸怠匪 噺 月沈岫倦弔彫岻 倦喋沈 噺 月盤倦張沈貸怠匪 噺 月沈袋怠岫倦弔彫岻 
where ki represents the key in the i time slice and hi represents a hash function to the order i. 
The three phases of operation use the described cryptographic keying material to provide 
cluster based security in a hierarchical manner. 
c. Cluster Generation Phase 
During the cluster generation phase, nodes decide to be either cluster heads or cluster 
members. This decision is based on a variable called weight [Basagni et al, 2001].  Node i’s 
weight wi is a representation of the node’s current capacity status, which is made up of 
factors such as: battery power, and distance from other nodes etc.  The cluster head will 
manage the group keying services for that cluster.  The cluster heads then discover each 
other and establish a cluster head backbone, which is used to distribute updated traffic 
encryption key kTEK.    
The cluster generation phase follows the following three steps: 
1. Nodes share their weights.  Each node i calculates its weight wi . It then broadcasts its id 
and  wi to its one-hop neighbours, and encrypts it with the hello key kH . This provides 
confidentiality and, along with the group identity key, they provide authentication.  
The message is as follows. 継賃那岫拳沈】件穴沈】継懲奈内岫拳沈】件穴沈岻岻 
2. After receiving the weighted messages from all its neighbours, node i will decide if it is 
a cluster head or cluster member.  Once a role has been selected by node i it broadcasts 
its role to its neighbours in the following message. 継賃那岫拳沈】件穴沈】堅剣健結】継懲奈内岫拳沈】件穴沈】堅剣健結岻岻 
The role of node i is decided by its weight.  The highest weighted node will broadcast a 
role of ch, cluster head, while other nodes will broadcast a role of idj, where j is the 
identity of the cluster head that node i will belong to. 
3. The cluster heads are then inter-connected.  All cluster members inform their cluster 
head of any other cluster heads within a three hop radius.  The network is effectively 
segmented and clusters are interconnected by a cluster head backbone, as illustrated in 
Figure 15. 
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Fig. 15. Segmented network with cluster backbone 
d. Operation Phase 
During the operational phase, the nodes use the group identity key kGI to authenticate nodes 
and provide message integrity. The traffic encryption key kTEK is used to encrypt the 
application data and provide message confidentiality.  These services are provided using the 
cryptographic functions of symmetric encryption algorithms and the one-way hash function 
[Basagni, 2001]. 
e. Key Update Phase 
The traffic encryption key is updated periodically. This period is measured by an externally 
set parameter tupdate (key update period). Updating occurs during the key update phase.  
Firstly, a key manager is selected from the pool of all the cluster heads.  Selection is done by 
each cluster head, which checks if it is a potential key manager, by comparing its weight 
with the neighbouring cluster heads. Secondly, an exponential delay period, statistically 
averaged to 〉, is set aside, as to minimize the risk of multiple nodes becoming key 
managers [Basagni, 2001].  Thirdly, the cluster head with the highest weight value will arise 
as the selected key manager. The key managers purpose is to generate a new traffic 
encryption key kTEK and then distribute this to all the cluster heads, effectively updating the 
traffic key (which provides message confidentiality).  The new kTEK is generated using a 
secure key generation algorithm.  This new traffic key is distributed to the cluster heads 








c Cluster head 
Cluster Member 
Inter cluster backbone 
c
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Once the cluster heads have received the new traffic key this is distributed to the cluster 
members using the cluster key kc , which is generated by the cluster head.  The message sent 
to the cluster members is: 継賃頓岫拳頂】件穴頂】倦脹帳懲博博博博博博】継懲奈内岫拳頂】件穴頂】倦脹帳懲博博博博博博岻岻 
These three phases are repeated every network time-slice.  The shorter this time-slice, the 
greater the security obtained.  Similarly, this applies to the tupdate period for the key update 
phase.  However, in this case, it stands that the shorter the update period or time-slice, the 
more resources are required.   
f. Analysis 
This scheme is designed for large ad hoc networks, which are made up of nodes with 
limited processing power and storage capacity. Public key cryptography is unsuited for 
such a design, as this solution is realized through symmetric key cryptography. This 
solution requires a TTP to initialise the network nodes with the group identity key kGI and 
set the parameters, such as the tupdate time period. 
The group identity key, which is distributed to all participating nodes, is required to remain 
secret throughout the lifetime of the network. In [Basagni, 2001] the authors of the Secure 
Pebblenets solution propose that nodes have tamper-resistant storage, which securely holds 
the group identity key.  Standard network devices do not have such features and this limits 
its application for mobile ad hoc networks.  If an attacker were to compromise the group 
identity key, all the nodes in the network would need to be re-initialized with a new group 
identity key, given by a TTP. 
The clustering approach does benefit large ad hoc networks, as routing algorithms for long 
distances or large networks can become complex and expensive. Cluster based 
communication allows for packets travelling long distances to travel via the cluster 
backbone, until they reach their desired neighbourhood or cluster.  From there the cluster 
head can transmit the packets more specifically. This approach reduces security 
computation and routing complexity in large networks.  
A cluster head centralizes the authority in a network. In doing so, it provides a central point 
of attack for adversaries. Nodes within mobile ad hoc networks have unreliable 
characteristics because of their mobility and wireless sporadic connectivity. Selecting a 
reliable cluster head may become a problem in these dynamic networks.  Nodes may also 
refuse to adopt the computational burden of being the cluster head. This is due to resource 
constraints inherent to mobile ad hoc networks. 
Authentication is limited to groups to reduce computational requirements of nodes.  It was 
found that if authentication was to be extended to the individual nodes, it would require the 
management of 券 抜 岫津貸怠岻態   symmetric keys [William, 1999]. Therefore, this solution is not 
feasible for peer-to-peer communication. 
3.7 Proximity-based identification 
Smetters et al [Smetters et al, 2002] proposed a solution called demonstrative identification. 
This solution allows nodes to establish initial trust relationships without prior knowledge or 
relationship and without the existence of an off-line TTP, which most key management 
systems assume. This solution uses close proximity channels to establish initial 
bootstrapping and provides a basis for more complex key establishment. Demonstrative 
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identification approach is designed for spontaneous, small, localized short term ad hoc 
networks.  An example of such a network can be seen in the gathering of people in a coffee 
shop, where each person wishes to establish temporary communication network, via their 
PDA’s. 
a.  System Overview 
Two nodes desiring to establish a secure communication link, initially engage across a 
location-limited channel. This channel is separate to the main communication channel, as 
displayed in Figure 16. Location-limited channels include: infrared; physical contact; and 
audio etc.  Across the location-limited channel pre-authentication information is exchanged.  
For example, a user with a PDA who wants to communicate with a second user’s PDA can 
use an infrared channel. They can direct the PDA’s infrared device towards the second 
device and an exchange is made. The user can be assured that the pre-authentication 
information is from the chosen PDA, due to the nature and characteristics of infrared 
communication.   
 
 
Fig. 16. Proximity based identification with location-limited channel 
After the user has exchanged the pre-authentication information, a two-party (for example 
Diffie-Hellman) or group key exchange scheme can be implemented over the main 
communication channel. This is done in order to establish the keying material required for 
secure communication. A limited localized communication channel allows for 
communication without the existence of an off-line TTP or prior knowledge. 
b. Two-Party Key Exchange 
The key exchange between communication pair i and j is explained in the following steps: 
1. Nodes i and j make close proximity contact with each other using a common location-
limited channel. 
2. Pre-authentication information is exchange across the common location-limited 
channel.  Node i sends h(Ki) to node j and j sends h(Kj) to node i, where h(Kj) is the 
irreversible one-way hash function of a node j’s public key. 
3. Nodes i and j now exchange their public keys over the main channel such that j receives 計続博博博 and i receives 計卒博博博.  To avoid the impersonation attack which is common to mobile ad 
hoc networks, the public keys are then authenticated in step 4 using the pre-
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4. Authentication is checked using the one-way hash function h and verifies that h(計徹拍 ) = 
k(Ki) and h(計撤拍 ) = k(Ki). 
5. Upon successful verification, any asymmetric key-exchange protocol can be 
implemented to allow for nodes i and j to share a secret key. 
The two-party key-exchange described above is the basic formulae for demonstrative 
identification.  This protocol can also be applied to heterogeneous nodes, where public key 
encryption is available to only one of the two communication members.  This allows for 
nodes with limited complexity and computational capacity to participate in pair wise secret 
key exchange.  The procedure for a two-party key exchange, where only one of the members 
(node i) is the public key competent, is described as follows: 
1. Nodes i and j make contact on a location-limited channel, allowing i to send j, h(Ki) and 
j to send i, h(Sj), where Sjis a secret from j. 
2. Node i sends j, 計"徹博博博博over the main communication channel to realize authentication. 
3. Node j authenticates node i’s public key, Ki, by verifying that h(計"徹博博博博) = h(Ki). 
4. Upon successful authentication, node j sends 継懲日岫鯨珍岻 to i. 
5.  継懲日岫鯨撤拍岻 is decrypted at node i using Ki.  鯨撤拍  is then verified by checking that h(Sj) = h(鯨撤拍 ).  
Upon successful verification the two heterogeneous parties share a secret Sj , which can 
be used to establish secure communication keying material. 
c. Analysis 
This solution allows for a fully self-configured ad hoc network, as the initial trust 
establishment phase does not require the assistance of an off-line TTP.  Users realize the 
initial trust relationship by localized communication. For example, a user with a PDA would 
point its PDA to another PDA to automatically exchange authentication information and 
establish a secure communication line. 
This solution requires that nodes are equipped with location-limited communication 
devices. Examples of these devices are: infrared, audio or a wired link. This requirement 
limits the network participants to those possessing specific peripherals. The assumption is 
made that most portable wireless devices are equipped with some type of localized 
communication medium, such as infrared.  
The location-limited pre-authentication exchange realizes demonstrative identification 
[Smetters et al, 2002]. It only allows key-exchange to occur in a localized manner, where 
nodes are in close proximity to each other. As a result, this solution is not suited to large 
networks, but it is best suited to small spontaneous networks.  A solution presented by 
Capkun [Capkun et al, 2006] extends the self-issued certificate chaining approach as it 
implements a demonstrative identification approach in a PGP based network. Capkun’s 
proposal uses location-limited communication to establish initial trust and relies upon 
mobility to distribute this trust in large networks.  Such a proposal allows for demonstrative 
identification to be implemented in large to moderate networks. 
More recently, the Amigo proximity-based authentication system proposed by Scannell et al 
[Scannell et al, 2009], uses shared radio environment evidences as proof of physical 
proximity to authenticate localized mobile communication nodes.  
3.8 Self issued certificate chaining 
A PGP-based security solution for ad hoc networks is proposed by Capkun and Hubaux   
[Capkun et al, 2003] [Hubaux et al, 2001]. This solution uses a certificate chaining approach.  
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It outlines a fully self-organized public key management system that allows users to: 
generate their public-private key pairs; issue certificates; and perform authentication, 
without the presence of an off-line trusted third party.  Capkun and Hubaux focus on the 
key management and key distribution system.  Without the need of prior relationships or an 
organizational TTP member, this solution is best suited to spontaneous ad hoc networks.  
However, due to its complex initialization phase it is not suited for small short-term 
networks. 
a.  System Overview 
Public keys (K) and certificates are modelled as direct graphs G(V,E) where vertices, V, 
represent the public keys and the edges, E, represent a certificate between two vertices.  The 
self-organized system proposed by Capkun and Hubaux [Capkun et al, 2003] [Hubaux et al, 
2001] differs from PGP in that it relies on the users to store and distribute the certificates in a 
self-issued manner.  Each user node carries a certificate memory, consisting of certificates 
limited to local neighbourhood.  For a user to authenticate and certify another user’s public 
key, a certificate chain is first found between the two users, by combining the users’ 
certificate memory. Figure 17 illustrates a situation where node u and v request secure 
communication [Capkun et al, 2003].  Node u is required to verify the authenticity of the 
public key Kv for corresponding to node v.  To do so nodes u and v combine their certificate 
memories to find a certificate chain or path between Ku and Kv , which is made up of valid 
public key certificates shared between the two communicating nodes. 
The fully self-organized public key management system can be broken into four procedures 
of analysis, as follows: 
‚ Public/private key creation 
‚ Certificate exchange 
‚ Authentication 
‚ Certificate revocation 
‚ Load sharing 
During the initialization phase, the public-private keys are created and distributed with a 
certificate exchange procedure. Secure communication is realized and impersonation attacks 
are thwarted by the authentication of the available certificates. The certificate revocation 
protocol is outlined in order to maintain security and exclude malicious users.  Optimization 
is implemented by a load sharing protocol that ensures fair distribution of the work load 
and prevents selfish nodes in a network. 
Initialization phase is executed in a four step procedure which establishes trust in the 
network: 
1. The user creates their own public/private key pair 
2. The user issues public key certificates (vertices) based on the knowledge of the other 
public keys. 
3. The user performs certificate exchange and collecting certificates, and creates a non-
updated certificate repository. 
4. The user constructs an updated certificate repository, modelled as a graph Gu.  This is 
done by communicating with certificate graph neighbours or by a second method of 
applying the repository construction algorithm to the non-updated certificate 
repository. 
After initialization is complete, authentication between two users can take place, through 
certificate chaining.  Each step is explained in more detail below. 
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Fig. 17. A certificate chain or path between public keys Ku and Kv 
b. Public/private Key Creation 
Public and private keys for users are created locally.  Public key certificates are issued by the 
user. If the user u believes that a public key Kv belongs to v, then the user u can issue a public 
key binding Kv to user v, by the signature of u.  This certificate has an expiry time Tv.  A 
periodic update may be issued which simply extends expiry time Tv.  The reason for trust is 
not identified but assumed, for example through a physical side channel. 
c. Certificate exchange 
The certificate repositories are created automatically by exchanging certificates.  A user u 
has two certificate repositories: an update certificate repository Gu and a non-updated 
certificate repository GuN.  All certificates are stored twice, as when a certificate is issued, it is 
stored in both the certificate issuer u and certificate owner v’s repository.  Therefore, initially 
each certificate repository has only the certificates it has issued and those that have been 
issued to it.  Certificates are exchange periodically. Each node periodically polls its physical 
neighbour for certificates. 
A certificate exchange is performed by the following procedure: 
1. Node u broadcasts Gu and GuN to its physical neighbours.  The broadcast contains only 
identities (hash values). 
2. Neighbours reply with identities of their update repository G and non-update 
repository GN. 
3. Node u crosschecks the received sub-graphs and its sub-graphs for any additions. 
4. Node u requests those certificates it does not hold. 
After the initial convergence phase, all the certificates of the nodes are stored by all users. As 
a result, users’ non-update repositories are created. After this phase the nodes exchange 
only new certificates at a rate of TCE, which represents the time for a certificate to be 





u’s local certificate repository 
v’s local certificate repository 
combined certificate path between 
u and v 
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d. Construction of updated certificate repositories 
The exchange of certificates provides an incomplete view of the graph and allows each node 
to create its own non-updated certificate repository.  The updated repository Gu will consist 
of certificates which user u keeps updated.  There are two approaches in this creation: 
1. Apply algorithm A to GuN which results in Gu, and validity of each certificate is checked.   
2. Communicate with certificate graph neighbours only. 
The maximum degree algorithm is an algorithm A proposed by [Capkun et al, 2003] which 
is applied to the non-update repository GuN to create the update repository Gu in [Capkun et 
al, 2003] [Hubaux et al, 2001].  The algorithm selects a sub-graph that consists of two 
logically distinct paths: the out-bound path and the in-bound path, which are made up of 
outgoing edges and incoming edges, respectively.  The selection of Gu’s out-bound path is 
done in multiply rounds in the following manner [Capkun et al, 2003] [Hubaux et al, 2001]: 
1. Each round runs from vertex Kvert, starting with vertex Ku. 
2. User u requests the outgoing edge list of vertex Kvert.  This is possible as every vertex 
stores this list locally. 
3. An outgoing edge (with its terminating vertex z) is selected from the list in 2.  Selection 
is based on the highest number of shortcuts of the terminating vertex z.  Where a 
shortcut is defined as an edge, and removed, the shortest indirect path between the 
nodes, previously connected by that edge, becomes larger than two.  User u can 
determine its number of shortcuts by gathering information about the outgoing and 
incoming edges of its adjacent users. 
4. The selected vertex z is added to a set Nout of vertices selected, thus far. This is done to 
ensure that the selected out-bound paths are disjointed. 
5. The round is finished and now the terminating vertex z becomes Kvert and a new round 
begins, starting from step 1. 
The in-bound path selection is done in a similar way: 
1. Each round runs from vertex Kvert , starting with vertex Ku. 
2. User u requests the incoming edge list of vertex Kvert.  Every vertex stores this list 
locally.  Therefore, this step requires that each user be notified whenever another user 
issues a certificate to that user. 
3. An incoming edge (with its originating vertex y) is selected from the list in 2.  Selection 
is based on the highest number of shortcuts of the originating vertex y.  
4. The selected vertex y is added to a set Nin of vertices selected so far, to ensure that the 
selected in-bound paths are disjointed. 
5. The round is finish and now the originating vertex y becomes Kvert and a new round 
begins, starting from step 1. 
The update repository is the union of the in-bound sub-graph and out-bound sub-graph.  
The pure method will operate on a single round. However, it is extended so the update 
repository consists of several vertex disjoint out-bound and vertex disjoint in-bound paths.  
The final sub-graph is star-like information. 
e. Authentication 
When initialization is complete, the user is prepared to perform authentication.  
Authentication is preformed between users u and v with public keys Ku and Kv respectively, 
as follows: 
Firstly, user u and user v merge their update certificate repository (Gu and Gv) to find a 
certificate chain between u and v.  User u then looks for a path in Gu and Gv.  Validity and 
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correctness checks are done to all certificates in the discovered path.  Validity, checks that 
the certificates are not revoked.  Correctness, checks the certificates contain the correct user-
key bindings.  
If no certificate chain is found, user u combines its two repositories of the updated and non-
updated certificates to find a chain.  User u searches for a path in Gu and GuN.  If a chain is 
found, then u requests the updates of the expired certificates.  Subsequently, the validity and 
correctness checks are made. 
If there is still no certificate chain found between Ku and Kv then authentication is aborted.  
During authentication nodes that are one-hop physical neighbours (also known as helper 
nodes) are given precedence as to maximize performance.  When a path is found, the 
certificates (edges) along this path are then used by user u to authenticate Kv. 
f. Certificate revocation 
Certificates are revoked when it is believed that the user-key binding is no longer valid.   If a 
user believes his own private key is compromised then he can revoke his public key 
certificate binding.  This is done in two ways, explicitly and implicitly: 
1. Explicitly, a user u would revoke a certificate issued by u, by broadcasting a revoke 
statement broadcast to its Gu nodes.  The certificate exchange scheme allows for this 
revoke to reach all other nodes at a time delay of TCE. 
2. Implicit revocation is based on the expiration of certificates.  Certificates are valid for a 
given time Tv after which they must be updated. 
This allows for comprised certificates and private keys, to be dealt with explicitly, and 
provides a higher level of confidence by implicitly maintaining validity. 
The fully distributive nature of this scheme means every certificate is stored at each node 
allowing for nodes to cross-check conflict and detects inconsistent certificates. 
To combat false certificate bindings the following two procedures are taken: 
1. If a certificate is received which doesn’t exist in Gu or GuN then it and the issuer are 
labelled unspecified until a period Tp where Tp > TCE where after if no conflicting 
certificates are received then it is marked non-conflicting.  This does not prevent against 
Sybil attacks though. 
2. If a certificate conflict is found where a user u has two certificate bindings (v,Kv) and 
(v,K’v).  Both certificates and the certificates that certified them are labelled as conflicting.  
To resolve such a conflict, validity of certificates is first checked with their issuers. If 
validity status remains true, then u will try to find chains of non-conflicting valid 
certificates to public keys Kv and K’v.  Confidence values are calculated based on the 
number and length of chains, and values compared to compute the correctness of the 
bindings.  If no decision is made these bindings are labelled as conflicting and the node 
waits for more information to resolve the conflict. 
In this case, a confidence algorithm is not identified but assumed. This conflict resolution 
mechanism can be further used: to evaluate trust in users; to issue correct certificates; and to 
detect malicious users. 
g. Load Sharing 
For an update to occur nodes contact the issuer of the certificates that they store. This 
approach is not efficient because one certificate issuer could be overloaded and unable to 
handle the computational work load.  Simple load sharing is implemented which allows for 
relief. Each node u provides updates to up to s other nodes, where s is equal to size of u’s 
Mobile Ad-Hoc Networks: A plications
www.intechopen.com
Trust Establishment in Mobile Ad Hoc Networks: Key Management 187 
updated repository. After which node u has provided s updates, it replies to update requests 
with a list of nodes that get updates directly from u. The requesting node then randomly 
selects a node from u’s list and requests its update from that node. 
h. Analysis 
The self organized, self certificate issuing trust model is a web of trust type model inheriting 
PGP characteristics and applying them to an ad hoc network environment.  In a similar way 
that PGP [Zhou & Hass, 1999] realizes trust, the certificate chaining approach is used to 
create chains of hierarchical trust between users.  The main difference between PGP and the 
certificate chaining solution is that PGP stores certificates in a centralized manner, and this 
scheme decentralizes this procedure through local certificate repositories. 
The main advantage of this scheme is that it is fully self-organized and does not require the 
presence of a TTP.  Trust is established in a self-organised manner with self-certificate being 
issued by the nodes themselves.  The initial phase requires nodes to interact and establish 
trust. Trust relationship can take time to establish. Therefore, in the early stages of the 
network, an initial time delay can be expected limiting the effectiveness of communication.  
For this reason, this network is not suited for short term mobile ad hoc network. An 
example of this shortcoming is illustrated in Figure 18, where node A wants to communicate 
with node B.  At the early stage of the network only D and C have issued certificates and as 
a result no certificate chain exists between A and B.  Only once the intermediate nodes have 
issued certificates will a certificate chain between A and B be possible.  
 
 
Fig. 18. Initial phase delay problem  
The use of certificate chains is identified as vulnerable, because a chain of trust is ‘only as 
strong as its weakest link’. A PGP hierarchical trust model is adopted that assumes 
transitive trust.  This web-of-trust based approach allows for more flexibility than the other 
certificate approaches.  However, a no central administration is present to enforce policy 
and trust assessment. Therefore, because of this lack of structure, it is more prone to attacks 
by malicious nodes.  This solution is best suited to open mobile ad hoc networks, but may 
not be suited to applications where high degrees of security is required [Davis, 2004], like 
closed military mobile ad hoc networks. 
This self-organized scheme is fully distributive which would result in a certificate updated 
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expense.  However, a better load balancing data management schemes can be introduced to 
further relieve the load [Hubaux et al, 2001].   
The maximum degree algorithm A (or Shortcut Hunter Algorithm) is implemented to 
maximise effectiveness and optimise the update procedure. This proposal has been tested on 
PGP trust graphs. Nevertheless, an ad hoc network does not have the privilege of every 
node having public knowledge of all the certificates available.  Step 3 of the maximum 
degree algorithm requires that an edge is selected from vert to z , where z is the vertex with 
the highest number of shortcuts.  To determine z knowledge of the surrounding trust graph 
is required, which may not be available to all ad hoc network members. 
One of the main disadvantages of a fully self-organized model is that nodes can adopt as 
many identities as they have resources, in order to support further steps which need to be 
taken to protect this solution from Sybil and impersonation type attacks [Capkun et al, 
2003]. 
3.9 Discussion and summary 
The solutions presented in this section give a summary of the work related to key 
management in mobile ad hoc networks. The solutions differ considerably in requirements, 
complexity and functionality.  Each solution is suited for different types of ad hoc network 
environments. Criteria which these key management solutions can be grouped or 
differentiated included: 
‚ Pre-configuration: Planned vs Spontaneous 
This describes the pre-requisites and assumptions that are made for the nodes participating 
or joining the network.  If an ad hoc network is planned then nodes can be assumed to have 
some pre-configured information, for example: initial shared secret; certificate; or 
authenticated identification. If the network is spontaneous then nodes have no prior security 
relationships or initial data assumptions.  Pure ad hoc networks are more spontaneous 
allowing for nodes to join and leave the network without complex pre-configurations and 
assumptions made. 
‚ Network Area: Local vs Distributive 
This describes the area or space in which the key management scheme is operating. The 
physical topology of the network would result in more close proximity interaction or more 
multi-hop distributive interaction. A localized area is a network in which nodes come within 
a close proximity range of each other, such as in a classroom. A distributive area is a 
network where nodes are located some distance apart with little possibility of physical 
interaction. Certain key management schemes do not function in a distributive network 
area. 
‚ Network Duration: Short Term vs Long Term 
The duration of the network can dictate the initialization period of the key management 
scheme.  For short term ad hoc networks, a group of nodes establish communication for a 
short time period and may never come into contact again.  Short term ad hoc networks 
require speedy initialization and require communication to be available at the start of the 
network, without an initial period of weakened or delayed secure communication. Long 
term ad hoc networks consist of nodes that plan to be part of a network and in relationship 
with other nodes for a longer time period. Furthermore, nodes retain information and 
relationships with other nodes even when they leave the network.  Long term ad hoc 
networks require more complex trust establishment. 
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‚ Off-line TTP Involvement 
Ad hoc networks are characterized by their lack of infrastructure.  Key management scheme 
often rely on an off-line trusted third party (TTP) for initialization and operational security.  
The extent of the off-line TTP involvement describes the self-organized nature of the 
network.  Ideally, an ad hoc network has no off-line TTP involvement at the initialization or 
operational stages. 
A summary of the presented key management solutions given in Table-1 with respects to 
the criteria discussed above. The off-line TTP model relies on an external TTP to establish 
and maintain security. This model is suited for networks which have available fixed 
infrastructure and will therefore have limited mobility.  The partially and fully distributive 
CA solutions are similar using threshold cryptography, as they distribute the hierarchical 
trust of a certificate authority. They are suited to large planned ad hoc networks like military 
battlefield networks or disaster area networks. The Secure Pebblenet scheme is a cluster 
based model which is ideal for hierarchical group-oriented ad hoc networks where all nodes 
are distributed in a large network area and nodes have limited resources.  An application of 
this cluster based approach is sensor networks.  
The Self-Issued Certificate model or certificate chaining model uses a localized PGP web of 
trust approach.  Its self-organized nature makes this solution most suited to spontaneous 
networks, such as peer-to-peer communication in a classroom or coffee shop. The proximity-
based identification solution is suited to localized networks. Its greatest advantage is that it 
requires no prior knowledge to establish trust.  The proximity-based identification method 
is, used in Capkun’s mobility based approach, uses mobility of nodes to establish initial 
trust relationships across a large network. 
This section shows that many of the solutions presented have issues which need to be 
resolved.  Key management is an integral part of providing security and, as identified in 
Section-1, the routing layer is the focus of attack for adversaries.  If these MANETS are to be 
recognized as secure, then mobile ad hoc network’s security mechanism must strive to 










Off-line TTP Model Planned Long-term Distributive Full 
Partially 
Distributed CA 
Planned Long-term Distributive Initialization 
Fully 
 Distributed CA 
Planned Long-term Distributive Initialization 
Self Issued
Certificates 
Spontaneous Long-term Distributive None 
Cluster based 
Model 
Planned Long-term Distributive Initialization 
Proximity-base
Identification 
Spontaneous Short-term Localized None 
Table  1. Summary of Key Management Solutions 
189li i il : t
www.intechopen.com
Mobile Ad-Hoc Networks: Applications 190 
4. References 
[Abdul-Rahman, 1997] A. Abdul-Rahman, "The PGP trust model," EDI-Forum: The Journal of 
Electronic Commerce, vol. 10, pp. 27-31, 1997. 
[Aram et al, 2003] K. Aram, K. Jonathan, and A. A. William, "Toward Secure Key 
Distribution in Truly Ad-Hoc Networks," in Proceedings of the 2003 Symposium on 
Applications and the Internet Workshops (SAINT'03 Workshops): IEEE Computer 
Society, 2003. 
[Awerbuch et al, 2002] B. Awerbuch, D. Holmer, C. Nita-Rotaru, and H. Rubens, "An on-
demand secure routing protocol resilient to byzantine failures," in Proceedings of the 
1st ACM workshop on Wireless security Atlanta, GA, USA: ACM, 2002. 
[Basagni et al, 2001] S. Basagni, K. Herrin, D. Bruschi, and E. Rosti, "Secure pebblenets," in 
Proceedings of the 2nd ACM international symposium on Mobile ad hoc networking 
\&amp; computing Long Beach, CA, USA: ACM, 2001. 
[Bruce, 2003] S. Bruce, Beyond Fear: Thinking Sensibly about Security in an Uncertain World: 
Springer-Verlag New York, Inc., 2003. 
[Capkun et al., 2003] S. Capkun, L. Butty, and J.-P. Hubaux, "Self-Organized Public-Key 
Management for Mobile Ad Hoc Networks," IEEE Transactions on Mobile 
Computing, vol. 2, pp. 52-64, 2003. 
[Capkun et al, 2006] S. Capkun, L. Buttyan, and J.-P. Hubaux, "Mobility Helps Peer-to-Peer 
Security," IEEE Transactions on Mobile Computing, vol. 5, pp. 43-51, 2006. 
[Chor et al, 1985]  B. Chor, S. Goldwasser, S. Micali, and B. Awerbuch, "Verifiable secret 
sharing and achieving simultaneity in the presence of faults (extended abstract)," 
proc. 26th IEEE Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, October, 21-23 
1985. 
[Davis, 2004] C. R. Davis, "A localized trust management scheme for ad hoc networks. ," In: 
3rd International Conference on Networking (ICN’04), pp. 671–675, 2004. 
[Desmendt & Jajodia, 1997] Y. Desmedt and S. Jajodia, "Redistributing Secret Shares to New 
Access Structures and Its Applications," Department of Information and Software 
Engineering, School of Information Technology and Engineering, George Mason 
University, Technical ReportJuly 1997. 
[Douceur, 2002] J. R. Douceur, "The Sybil Attack," in Revised Papers from the First 
International Workshop on Peer-to-Peer Systems: Springer-Verlag, 2002. 
[Eschenauer & Gligor, 2002] L. Eschenauer and V. D. Gligor, "A Key-Management Scheme 
for Distributed Sensor Networks," proc. 9th ACM Conf. on Computer and 
Communication Security (ACM CCS'02), November, 17-21 2002. 
[Frankel et al, 1997] Y. Frankel, P. Gemmell, D. MacKenzie, and M. Yung, "Optimal 
resilience proactive public key cryptosystems," proc. 38th Annual Symposium on 
Foundations of Computer Science (FOCS '97), October, 19-22 1997. 
[Haas et al, 2002]  Haas J.D.Z., Liang B., P. Papadimitatos and S. Sajama, "Wireless ad hoc 
networks," in Encyclopedia of Telecommunications J. W. John Proakis, Ed., 2002. 
[Hashmi & Brooke, 2008] Hashmi S. and J. Brooke, "Authentication Mechanisms for Mobile 
Ad-Hoc Networks and Resistance to Sybil Attack," in Proceedings of the 2008 Second 
International Conference on Emerging Security Information, Systems and Technologies - 
Volume 00: IEEE Computer Society, 2008. 
Mobile Ad-Hoc Networks: A plications
www.intechopen.com
Trust Establishment in Mobile Ad Hoc Networks: Key Management 191 
[Herzberg et al, 1995] Herzberg A., S. Jaracki, H. Krawczyk, and M. Yung, "Proactive Secret 
Sharing Or: How to Cope With Perpetual Leakage," proc. Advances in Cryptology - 
CRYPTO '95, 1995. 
[Herzberg et al, 1997] Herzberg A., M. Jakobsson, S. Jarecki, H. Krawczyk, and M. Yung, 
"Proactive Public Key and Signature Systems," proc. 4th ACM Conf. on Computer and 
communications security, April, 1-4 1997. 
[Hu et al, 2003a] Hu Y.C., A. Perrig, and D. B. Johnson, "Rushing attacks and defense in 
wireless ad hoc network routing protocols," in Proceedings of the 2nd ACM workshop 
on Wireless security San Diego, CA, USA: ACM, 2003. 
[Hubaux et al, 2001] Hubaux J.-P., L. Butty, and S. Capkun, "The quest for security in mobile 
ad hoc networks," in Proceedings of the 2nd ACM international symposium on Mobile ad 
hoc networking \&amp; computing Long Beach, CA, USA: ACM, 2001. 
[Jarecki, 1995]  Jarecki S., "Proactive secret sharing and public key cryptosystems," 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), 1995. 
[Jameson, 2008] Jameson H., "Secure Military Networks: The war without weapons," 2008. 
[Karl & Rauscher, 2001] Karl W.C.,  F. Rauscher, "Wireless Emergency Rescue Team 
(WRET) Final Report for the September 11, 2001 New York City World Trade 
Center Terrorist Attack," 2001. 
[Lidong & Zygmunt, 1999] Lidong Z. and H. Zygmunt, "Securing Ad Hoc Networks," 
Cornell University1999. 
[Luo & Lu, 2000] Luo H. and S. Lu, "Ubiquitous and robust authentication services for ad 
hoc wireless networks," Computer Science Department, University of California, 
Technical ReportOctober 2000. 
[Luo et al, 2002] Luo H., P. Zerfos, J. Kong, S. Lu, and L. Zhang, "Self-securing Ad Hoc 
Wireless Networks," proc. Seventh International Symposium on Computers and 
Communications (ISCC'02), July 1-4 2002. 
[Menezes et al, 1996b] Menezes A.J., S. A. Vanstone, and P. C. V. Oorschot, Handbook of 
Applied Cryptography: CRC Press, Inc., 1996. 
[Molva & Michardi, 2003] Molva R. and P. Michiardi, "A Game Theoretical Approach to 
Evaluate Cooperation Enforcement Mechanisms in Mobile Ad hoc Networks 
(extended abstract)," in proc. Modeling and Optimization in Mobile, Ad Hoc and 
Wireless Networks (WiOpt'03), 2003. 
[Papadimitratos & Hass, 2003] Papadimitratos P. and Z. J. Haas, "Secure Link State Routing 
for Mobile Ad Hoc Networks," in Proceedings of the 2003 Symposium on Applications 
and the Internet Workshops (SAINT'03 Workshops): IEEE Computer Society, 2003. 
[Perkins & Bhagwat, 1994] Perkins C.E. and P. Bhagwat, "Highly dynamic Destination-
Sequenced Distance-Vector routing (DSDV) for mobile computers," SIGCOMM 
Comput. Commun. Rev., vol. 24, pp. 234-244, 1994. 
[Perkins et al, 2003] Perkins C., E. Belding-Royer, and S. Das, Ad hoc On-Demand Distance 
Vector (AODV) Routing: RFC Editor, 2003. 
[Qian & Li, 2007] Qian L., N. Song, and X. Li, "Detection of wormhole attacks in multi-path 
routed wireless ad hoc networks: a statistical analysis approach," J. Netw. Comput. 
Appl., vol. 30, pp. 308-330, 2007. 
[Raya & Hubaux, 2005] Raya M. and J. P. Hubaux, "The Security of Vehicular Ad Hoc 
Networks," in proc. ACM Workshop on Security of Ad Hoc and Sensor Networks 
(SASN'05), 2005. 
191li i il : t
www.intechopen.com
Mobile Ad-Hoc Networks: Applications 192 
[Salem et al, 2005] Salem N.B., L. Buttyan, J.-P. Hubaux, and M. Jakobsson, "Node 
Cooperation in Hybrid Ad Hoc Networks," IEEE Transactions on Mobile Computing, 
2005. 
[Scannell et al, 2009] Scannell A., A. Varshavsky, A. LaMarca, and E. D. Lara, "Proximity-
based authentication of mobile devices," Int. J. Secur. Netw., vol. 4, pp. 4-16, 2009. 
[Shamir, 1979] Shamir A., "How to share a secret," Communications of the ACM, vol. 22, pp. 
612-613, 1979. 
[Smetters et al, 2002] Smetters D.B., D. Balfanz, D. K. Smetters, P. Stewart, and H. C. Wong, 
"Talking To Strangers: Authentication in Ad-Hoc Wireless Networks," 2002. 
[Stalling, 2002] Stallings W., Cryptography and Network Security: Principles and Practice: 
Pearson Education, 2002. 
[Stalling, 2003] Stallings W., Cryptography and Network Security: Principles and Practices: 
Prentice Hall, 2003. 
[Steiner et al, 1996] Steiner M., G. Tsudik, and M. Waidner, "Diffie-Hellman Key Distribution 
Extended to Groups," in proc. Third ACM Conf. on Computer and Communication 
Security, 1996. 
[Talzi et al, 2007] Talzi I., A. Hasler, S. Gruber, and C. Tschudin, "PermaSense: investigating 
permafrost with a WSN in the Swiss Alps," in Proceedings of the 4th workshop on 
Embedded networked sensors Cork, Ireland: ACM, 2007. 
[Tseng et al, 2003] Tseng C.Y., P. Balasubramanyam, C. Ko, R. Limprasittiporn, J. Rowe, and 
K. Levitt, "A specification-based intrusion detection system for AODV," in 
Proceedings of the 1st ACM workshop on Security of ad hoc and sensor networks Fairfax, 
Virginia: ACM, 2003. 
[Van der Merwe &Dawoud, 2004] Van der Merwe J., D. Dawoud, and S. McDonald, "A 
Proactively Secure Threshold-multisignature Scheme based on Publicly Verifiable 
Distributed Key Generation and Publicly Verifiable Secret Redistribution," IEEE 
Transactions on Parallel and Distributed Systems, 2004. 
[Van der Merwe &Dawoud, 2005] Van der Merwe J., D. Dawoud, and S. McDonald, "Fully 
Self-Organized Peer-to-Peer Key Management for Mobile Ad Hoc Networks," proc. 
ACM Workshop on Wireless Security (WiSe'05), September, 2 2005. 
[Verma et al, 2001] Verma R., D. O'Mahony, and H. Tewari, "NTM- Progressive Trust 
Negotiation in Ad Hoc Networks," 2001. 
[William, 1999] William S., Cryptography and network security (2nd ed.): principles and 
practice: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1999. 
[Yi & Kravets, 2001] Yi S. and R. Kravets, "Practical PKI for Ad Hoc Wireless Networks," 
Department of Computer Science, University of Illinois, Technical ReportAugust 
2001. 
[Yi & Kravets, 2003] Yi S. and R. Kravets, "MOCA: Mobile certificate authority for wireless 
ad hoc networks," in proc. of the 2nd Annual PKI Research Workshop (PKI 2003), 2003. 
[Zhou & Hass, 1999]  Zhou L. and Haas Z.J., "Securing Ad Hoc Networks," IEEE Network: 
special issue on network security, vol. 13, pp. 24-30, 1999. 
Mobile Ad-Hoc Networks: A plications
www.intechopen.com
Mobile Ad-Hoc Networks: Applications
Edited by Prof. Xin Wang
ISBN 978-953-307-416-0
Hard cover, 514 pages
Publisher InTech
Published online 30, January, 2011
Published in print edition January, 2011
InTech Europe
University Campus STeP Ri 
Slavka Krautzeka 83/A 
51000 Rijeka, Croatia 
Phone: +385 (51) 770 447 
Fax: +385 (51) 686 166
www.intechopen.com
InTech China
Unit 405, Office Block, Hotel Equatorial Shanghai 
No.65, Yan An Road (West), Shanghai, 200040, China 
Phone: +86-21-62489820 
Fax: +86-21-62489821
Being infrastructure-less and without central administration control, wireless ad-hoc networking is playing a
more and more important role in extending the coverage of traditional wireless infrastructure (cellular
networks, wireless LAN, etc). This book includes state-of the-art techniques and solutions for wireless ad-hoc
networks. It focuses on the following topics in ad-hoc networks: vehicular ad-hoc networks, security and
caching, TCP in ad-hoc networks and emerging applications. It is targeted to provide network engineers and
researchers with design guidelines for large scale wireless ad hoc networks.
How to reference
In order to correctly reference this scholarly work, feel free to copy and paste the following:
Dawoud D.S., Richard L. Gordon, Ashraph Suliman and Kasmir Raja S.V. (2011). Trust Establishment in
Mobile Ad Hoc Networks: Key Management, Mobile Ad-Hoc Networks: Applications, Prof. Xin Wang (Ed.),
ISBN: 978-953-307-416-0, InTech, Available from: http://www.intechopen.com/books/mobile-ad-hoc-networks-
applications/trust-establishment-in-mobile-ad-hoc-networks-key-management
© 2011 The Author(s). Licensee IntechOpen. This chapter is distributed
under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-
ShareAlike-3.0 License, which permits use, distribution and reproduction for
non-commercial purposes, provided the original is properly cited and
derivative works building on this content are distributed under the same
license.
